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GRANDPARENT VISITATION RIGHTS:
SOCIAL POLICIES AND LEGAL RIGHTS
ELAINE D. INGtULLI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ten years ago, the notion that grandparents might have legally enforceable
rights to visit their grandchildren was a radical one. Few courts,' and fewer
legislatures,2 had been willing to create such rights. Today, there are statutorily
created visitation rights in all but two states. 3 Grandparents' rights have been the
subject of much legal debate,4 and after hearings, the House Select Committee on
*Assistant Professor of Business Law, Temple University; B.A., S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook, 1970;
J.D., Hofstra University School of Law, 1977; L.L.M., Temple University School of Law, 1984.
The Author wishes to thank her husband, Dr. Brian P. Ackerman of The University of Delaware
Department of Psychology, for his help in developing the ideas for the Article and Professors Marina
Angel and Anthony J. Bocchino of Temple University School of Law.
' See Note, Visitation Rights of a Grandparent Over the Objection of a Parent: The Best In-
terests of the Child, 15 J. FAm. L. 51 (1976-77) [hereinafter cited as Note, Grandparent Visitation],
and Annot., 90 A.L.R. 3d 222 (1979).
2 Idaho (1972); Ohio (1972); Kansas, New Jersey and Tennessee (1971); California (1967); and
New York (1966). Nineteen of the present statutes were added between 1980-84.
To date, only Nebraska and Wyoming have no statutes granting the court discretion to order
grandparent visitation: ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1983); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (1983); Axuz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-337.01 (Supp. 1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1211.1, 57-135 (Supp. 1983); CALIF. CIV. CODE
§ 197.5 (Deering Supp. 1984), § 4601 (Deering 1984); COLO. REV. STAT § 19-1-116 (Supp. 1983); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 (Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c)
(1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-112 (Supp. 1984); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1976); IDAHO CODE §
32-1008 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 607(b), ch. 110 1/2 § 11-7.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-1 (Burns Supp. 1984); IoWA CODE § 598.35 (1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129
(1983); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 403.021, 405.021 (Supp. 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:572, 9:573 (West
Supp. 1984); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 752 (Supp. 1983-84); MD. CTS. & Jun. PROC. ANN.
§ 3-602(a)(4) (1984); MAsS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 119, § 39D (Michie/Law Co-op 1975 & Supp. 1984); MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.27, 727.27(A) (West 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1982); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-16-1 to 93-16-7 (Supp. 1983); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452-400(3) and 452.402 (Vernon Supp.
1984); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1983); NE. REV. STAT. § 123.123 (1979); N.H. RE. STAT. ANN.
§ 458.17 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT ANN. 40-9-1 to 4 (1983); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.2(b), 50-13-50) (Supp. 1983); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1983); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.05, 3109.11 (Baldwin 1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 10, § 5 (Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, §§ 1001-1015 (Purdon Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.2 (Supp. 1983); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-420 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-4-52-54 (Supp. 1983); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-6-301 (1984); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(d) (Vernon Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1984), §§ 30-5-1-2 (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011-1016 (Supp.
1984); VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240 (1983); W. VA. CODE
§§ 48-2-15(b)(1) (Supp. 1984), 48-2B-1 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1981).
' Foster & Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. Louis L.J. 643 (1979);
Gault, Statutory Grandchild Visitation, 5 ST. MARY'S L. J. 474 (1973); Zaharoff, Access to Children:
Towards a Model Statute for Third Parties, 15 FA. L.Q. 165 (1981); Note, Grandparents' Statutory
Visitation Rights and the Rights of Adoptive Parents, 49 BROOKLYN L. REv. 149 (1982); Note, Statutory
Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step Closer to the Best Interests of the Child, 26 CATH. U.
L. REv. 387 (1977); Note, Visitation of a Grandparent Over the Objection of a Parent, 15 J. FA..
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Aging and the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers have recommended
that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws consider
drafting a uniform law.'
Grandparents are not the only adults to claim a right to have access to children
not their own. In the past few decades, stepparents, 6 foster parents,7 psychological
parents,' putative fathers, 9 relatives,' 0 and babysitters" have all used the courts
to seek such access. Why, then, discuss the rights of grandparents as distinct from
the rights of other persons who may play a significant role in the lives of children?
To begin with, grandparents have already achieved a special status in the eyes
of the law. The overwhelming majority of states have determined that grandparents
are different from other persons by passing legislation that is specifically directed
L. 51 (1976-77); Note, Divesting Grandparents of Statutory Grandchild Visitation Rights by Stepparent
Adoption, 50 U. Mo. K.C.L. REV. 231 (1982); Note, Adoption: Visitation Rights of Natural Grand-
parents, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 645 (1979).
Grandparents: The Other Victims of Divorce and Custody Disputes, 1983: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Hum. Serv. of The House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., [hereinafter
cited as Hearings]; S. Res. 40, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1984).
6 Some states provide for stepparent visitation rights after divorce by statute. See, e.g., ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301; VA. CODE § 20-107.2 (Supp. 1984).
In addition, courts in six states have recognized stepparent visitation rights in the absence of specific
statutory authority. Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850 (Alaska 1982); Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921 (Ind. App. 1980); Looper v. McManus,
581 P.2d 487 (Okla. 1978); Spells v. Spells, 250 Pa. Super. 168, 378 A.2d 879 (1977); Gribble v. Grib-
ble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).
' See, e.g., In re Cobin, 320 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1982) (foster parents allowed to intervene in
divorce proceedings on the issue of custody); In re Tremayne Quame Idress, 286 Pa. Super. 480, 429
A.2d 40 (1981) (custody awarded to foster mother). On the issue of foster parents' liberty interest in
maintaining their relationship with their foster children, see Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare
of Tippecanoe County, 600 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v. Fulton County Div. Family &
Childrens Servs., 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Berhow v. Crow,
423 So.2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
1 See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1976) (custody
awarded to "psychological parent" where court found compelling reasons why it was in the best in-
terests of the child to award custody to a third party, rather than a parent).
9 Juan R. v. Necta V., 55 A.D.2d 33, 389 N.Y.S.2d 126 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (putative father
brought action for visitation). In some states putative fathers have been denied standing to seek visita-
tion unless paternity has been established. Petitioner F. v. Respondent R., 430 A.2d 1075 (Del. 1981).
Visitation has been conditioned on contributions to the support and maintenance of the child. Vallera
v. Rivera, 39 I11. App. 3d 775, 351 N.E.2d 391 (I11. App. Ct. 1976).
'° See, e.g., Reflow v. Reflow, 24 Or. App. 365, 545 P.2d 894 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (permanent
custody awarded to paternal aunt and uncle, with visitation rights to mother); Mathis v. Johnson, 258
S.C. 321, 188 S.E.2d 466 (1972) (permanent custody awarded to great-aunt and great-uncle, with visita-
tion awarded to maternal grandmother); Gotz v. Gotz, 274 Wis. 472, 80 N.W.2d 359 (1957) (maternal
aunt granted visitation rights).
" See Martin v. Sand, 444 A.2d 309 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1982) (awarding custody and guardianship
to the child's babysitter as "de facto custodian" of child in lawsuit against parents); Ross v. Hoffman,
33 Md. App. 333, 364 A.2d 596 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976), modified, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977).
[Vol. 87
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at grandparents.' 2 Courts have reasoned that differential treatment is justified by
biology, kinship, heredity, and the uniqueness of the relationship.' 3 Additionally,
some psychologists and psychiatrists believe that special treatment of grandparents
is appropriate because of a unique bond existing between grandparent and grand-
child, which is stronger than any other, except that between parent and child.'
4
Finally, demographic changes have strengthened the political clout of older
Americans. It has been estimated that approximately seventy percent of older peo-
ple in the United States have grandchildren.'" As a group, these grandparents are
healthier, more affluent, and better educated than ever before.' 6 Many belong to
the group labeled the "young-old," aged fifty-five to seventy, which many con-
sider to be the most politically powerful new age group."' Based on current life
expectancies, many will be grandparents for twenty to thirty years.' 8 Thus grand-
parents have been able to lobby for special legal treatment based on their status
as grandparents.' 9 Indeed, the political clout of grandparents is the best explana-
tion for the nationwide rush to pass grandparents statutes.
It is a fact grandparents now have a statutory right of access to their grand-
children in almost every state. Existing legislation is generally inadequate, however,
because it fails to confront a number of issues that recur in litigation involving
grandparents. There is general agreement that in addition to the usual costs of time
12 Cf. statutes in California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Ohio and Washington which are not aimed
directly at grandparents, but allow "any person" to petition for visitation rights. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4601; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59; HAwAI REv. STAT. § 571-46; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.05
(any person having an interest in the welfare of the child); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.240.
In Alaska and Virginia, grandparents are specifically named, although other persons can also
be granted visitation. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (in cases of divorce, separation or placement of a
child whose parents have died, the court may grant visitation to a grandparent or other person); VA.
CODE § 20-107.2 (Supp. 1984) (grandparents, stepparent or other family members).
"1 See, e.g., Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199 (1975) in which the New Jersey Supreme
Court permitted grandparents to visit with their grandchild, even after adoption, because of the unique
relationship between grandparents and grandchild, made even stronger in that case by the fact that the child
had lived with his mother and maternal grandparents after his parents were divorced.
" A. KORNHABER & K. WOODWARD, GRANDPARENTS AND GRANDCHILDREN 55 (1981).
" Hearings, supra note 5, at 1.
,6 A. KORNHABER & K. WOODWARD, supra note 14, at xxi.
" A. KORNHA"ER & K. WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 162.
" Hearings, supra note 5, at 1-2. The estimate is based on findings that most women become
grandmothers at approximately 50 years of age, and men become grandfathers around age 52.
'9 Among the witnesses at 1983 Congressional Hearings supra note 5, were Mr. and Mrs. Max
Chasens, founders of "Equal Rights for Grandparents," Baltimore, Maryland; Mr. and Mrs. Lee Sumpter,
founders of "Grandparents/Children's Rights, Inc." in Haslett, Michigan; and Dr. Arther Kornhaber,
founder and president of "Foundation for Grandparents" in Mt. Kisco, New York.
10 See generally CHILDREN, F.mns AN GovERNMAENT: PERSPECTIVES ON AmEHICAN SociAL POLICY,
(E. Zigler, S. Kagan and E. Klugman, eds. 1983) for a series of essays on the relationship between
social policy and research on child development. See also Monahan & Loftus, The Psychology of Law,
33 ANN. REv. PSYCHOLOOY 441 (1982) for a review of recent psychological research which addresses
the validity of assumptions underlying substantive law.
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and effort involved in litigation, such litigation involving children is particularly
undesirable because of its negative effects on the children. Thus, it makes sense
for states to reevaluate and amend legislation to avoid litigation.
The need to reevaluate existing legislation, however, is not a reason to support
uniform legislation. Instead, this Author takes the position that diversity is ap-
propriate given the relative newness of the rights involved and the absence of any
generally accepted social science findings justifying a uniform law.
The first part of this Article is an overview of research findings in the social
sciences which are relevant to grandparents. The second part addresses the major
issues that have arisen concerning grandparent visitation which should be considered
by state legislatures in redrafting visitation statutes.
II. SocIA SCIENCE RESEARCH FINDINGs
Social science findings can and should play a role in the formulation of social
policy through lawmaking. Indeed, this belief has been used to justify federal spend-
ing for social science research through such institutions as the National Science
Foundation and the National Institute of Mental Health. It has also played a role
in increasing the attention that research psychologists have paid to legal and policy
issues."0 Before a uniform act affecting a right that is less than two decades old
is drafted, we need to ask how much we know about the relationship between grand-
parents and grandchildren, and what effect that relationship has on children, grand-
parents, and families.
Generally, empirical and clinical research on children has blossomed and become
more sophisticated in the past few decades. In 1969, a committee studying the
feasibility of adopting Uniform Marriage and Divorce Legislation reported that
the psychological literature on various custody arrangements and their effects on
the development of children was sparse and inadequate. 21 Since that time, our
knowledge of the effects of divorce on children has been greatly enhanced by two
highly respected longitudinal studies, one, a clinical study by Wallerstein and Kelly,22
and, the other, a study by psychologists Heatherington, Cox, and Cox.21 There
11 Ellsworth and Levy, Legislative Reform of Child Custody Adjudication: An Effort to Rely
on Social Science Data in Formulating Legal Policies, 4 LAW & Soc. REV. 167, 168-69 (1969).
22 J. VALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SuRvVrG THE BREAKup: How CHILDREN AcTuALLY COPE WITH
DIVORCE (1980); Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Stress and Developmental Tasks, in STRESS, COPING
AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHILDREN (1983); Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experience
of the Child in Later Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 256 (1976); Kelly & Wallerstein, The Effects
of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early Latency, 46 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 20 (1976);
Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Pre-school Child, 14 J. AMER.
ACAD. CIU PSYCHIATRY 600 (1975); Wallerstein & Kelly, The Effects of Parental Divorce: The Adolescent
Experience, in Tim CHILD IN His FAMIY: CHILDREN AT PSYCHIATRIC RISK (1974).
23 Heatherington, Effects of Paiernal Absence on Personality Development in Adolescent Daughters,
7 DEv. PSYCH. 313 (1972); Children and Divorce, in PARENT-CHILD INTERACTION THEORY, RESEARCH
AND PROSPECTS, (1981); Heatherington, Cox & Cox, The Aftermath of Divorce, in MOTHER-CHILD,
[Vol. 87
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is also a growing body of literature on the importance of the father-child relation-
ship in families24 and on the effects of alternative parental lifestyles on children.25
Unfortunately, there are no equivalent comprehensive studies on the impor-
tance of the grandparent-grandchild relationship. 26 Researchers are just beginning
to look closely at the influence of grandparents on the well-being of children. In
one study, reported in a book that has been widely touted by grandparents lobbyists,
the authors stated that children who have close relationships with at least one grand-
parent are different from other children; they are emotionally secure, are not ageist,
and do not fear old age. These authors also reported the existence of a special
bond between grandparents and grandchildren which is stronger than any other
except that between parent and child. 27 These sweeping conclusions, however, were
based on a study that had several methodological weaknesses,28 and other research-
ers have not yet been able to replicate their results.29 Moreover, the authors based
their findings regarding the bonds formed between children and grandparents on
an attachment behavior theory propounded by John Bowlby in the late 1960s. Ac-
cording to Bowlby, children have a tendency to attach themselves to one figure
(a phenomena he labelled "monotropism") and this attachment is different from
other attachments children form °.3 More recent studies, however, have cast doubt
on the validity of some of Bowlby's theories.
FATHER-CHILD RELATIONS (1978); Heatherington, Cox & Cox, Family Interaction and the Social, Emo-
tional and Cognitive Development of Children Following Divorce, in TBE FAMILY: SETTING PRIoRTIES
(1979); Heatherington, Cox & Cox, Play and Social Interaction in Children Following Divorce, 35 J.
Soc. IssuE 26 (1979).
24 See generally FATHERHOOD AND FAM ILY POLICY (M. Lamb & A. Sagi eds. 1983) for recent
studies concerning fathers and children.
21 See NormrnmON.AL F~uums (M. Lamb ed. 1982) for recent research findings by various social
scientists concerning children in a variety of family environments.
26 There are, however, several studies on adolescents. See, e.g., Hartshorne & Manaster, Rela-
tionships with Grandparents: Contact, Importance, Role Conception, 15 J. AGIrNo & HUM. Dav. 233
(1983). The authors concluded from a study of college students that most considered their grandparents
to be important to their lives, and would like more contact with them than they in fact had.
Developmental psychologists do not consider adolescents to be "children." As a result, there
is a separate discipline known as adolescent psychology which is distinct from child psychology.
27 A. KORNHABER & K. WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 55.
28 The authors' method is described in A. KORNHABER & K. WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 6-7.
The study involved interviews with 300 children and adolescents aged 5-18 years old, and projective
drawings by the children. The authors did not control for demographic characteristics, making it dif-
ficult to drav any conclusions about causation, and failed to distinguish the children by age, despite
the differences in cognitive and emotional development of 5 and 18 year olds, as well as their ability
to draw. Moreover, the pictures were not evaluated on the basis of any preestablished objective criteria.
29 One measure of how good a study is, is whether the results can be replicated. So, for example,
the research on the effects of divorce by Wallerstein and Kelly, supra note 2, and by Heatherington,
Cox, and Cox, supra note 23, have been widely acclaimed for the reason that the two studies, using
different methodologies, reached consistent findings. See infra, notes 38-39 and accompanying text for
failure to replicate results of the Kornhaber-Woodward study.
10 See J. BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss (1980).
19851
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As a result of this later work, many psychologists now believe that children
can and do form bonds of varying strengths with different adults and that the
strongest bonds are not necessarily those between mother and child, as Bowlby
argued.3' Kornhaber and Woodward's findings of a bond between grandparents
and grandchildren, however, cannot be considered definitive because of weaknesses
in both the research design and the theoretical foundations of their study.
More recently, two researchers have headed a longitudinal study of all children
born on Martha's Vineyard between 1974 and 1975. As part of their study, they
looked at children living in extended family systems which the authors defined as
a multigenerational family with at least one grandparent living in close proximity
to the family, or having frequent interaction with the family. They expected to
find that the extended family benefitted children. Instead, based on their preliminary
findings, the authors suggest there is a relationship between the presence of an
extended family and overall poorer behavioral and psychological adjustment of
children at age three.2 The authors consider their findings preliminary and have
declined to draw broader generalizations about the specific role that grandparents
play in child development,13 but the findings do raise questions about the effects
on children.
The literature on the significance of the grandparent-grandchild relationship
is similarly devoid of conclusive findings.3 4 Kornhaber and Woodward argue that
grandparenting is a natural instinct, rooted in our biological makeup, manifested
by thoughts, feelings, and behavior; 3 and that being a grandparent is a critically
important role for the grandparents. 36 Again, however, one finds few empirical
studies that focus on the importance of the grandparent-grandchild relationship,
but the existing literature does not support the Kornhaber-Woodward thesis.
The general body of literature suggests that there is ambiguity regarding the
" See generally, M. RUTTER, MATERNAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED (2d. ed. 1981) for a review
of the research findings on attachment, bonding and the effects of separation on children. Dr. Michael
Rutter is Professor of Child Psychiatry at The Institute of Psychiatry, University of London, and the
highly respected author of numerous studies, books and articles on children.
32 Garrison & Earls, Preschool Behavior Problems and the Multigenerational Family: An Island
Community Study, 2 INT'L J. F m. PSYCH. 125 (1983). The study is part of the Martha's Vineyard
Child Health Survey, being directed by Dr. Earls.
" Id. at 127.
14 Johnson, A Cultural Analysis of the Grandmother, 5 RESEARCH ON AGING 547, 548 (1983).
See generally, TiM, RoLEs AND SELP IN OLD AGE (J. Gubrium, ed., 1976); Kahana & Kahana, Theoretical
and Research Perspectives on Grandparenthood, 2 AGING & HUM. DEV. 261 (1971); Kivnick, Grand-
parenthood & The Mental Health of Grandparents, 1 AGING & SOC. 1 (1981); Kivnick, Grandparent-
hood: An Overview of Meaning and Mental Health, 22 GERONT. 9 (1982).
11 A. KORNHABER & K. WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 55.
3' But see L. GEORGE, ROLE TRANSITIONS IN LATER LIFE, 89 (1980) ("Grandparenthood does not
appear to be a high-impact life event."); Wood & Robertson, The Significance of Grandparenthood,
in TIME, ROLES AND SELF IN OLD AGE (. Gubrium, ed. 1976) (the authors found that the role of a
grandparent was not significantly associated with life satisfaction, and that when in need, one good
friend is more important to maintaining morale than a dozen grandchildren).
[Vol. 87.
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grandparent role, 37 and that the experience is largely "idosyncratic, an acquired
and achieved status rather than one that is based solely on the ascriptive blood
tie."' 38 Kornhaber and Woodward based their conclusions, in part, on a finding
that grandparents mentally prepared themselves for the role when they first learned
they were to become grandparents.3 9 A recent study, however, found the opposite
to be true; that grandmothers had not mentally prepared for the role prior to the
birth of the grandchild. 40
There is evidence to support the conclusion that the grandparent role is not
of great importance to grandparents. Although family involvement is considered
important to the elderly, several researchers have found that relationships with peers
are of much greater significance to grandparents than relationships with
grandchildren. 41 The role of grandparent may be more important to those who
have experienced social losses, 2 a finding which may have significance for policies
governing visitation in case of death of a grandchild's parent.
Given the embryonic stage of our knowledge of the significance of the
grandparent-grandchild relationship, and the likelihood that reliable, sophisticated
research programs can be designed and implemented, a uniform act, at this time,
is premature. States already have conflicting ideas of which competing social policy
should govern, and that diversity of policy is appropriate and desirable, given the
current status of our knowledge.
The danger of a model, or proposed uniform statute, is that diversity will give
way to the "bandwagon effect" before we have a clear idea of the successes and
failures of the diverse statutes, and their effects on people. The recent history of
joint custody laws provides a case in point. Until recently, courts had awarded
custody of a child to only one divorced parent, usually subject to visitation or tem-
porary custody rights of the noncustodial parent. In 1980, only five states 3 had
legislation permitting joint custody as an alternative to traditional custody
arrangements, even if both parties wanted joint custody. Between 1980 and 1983,
twenty-eight states enacted joint custody laws, 4  and a bill was introduced in Con-
gress to cut Aid to Families of Dependent Children funds to states that did not
favor joint custody. 5
37 Kivnick, Grandparenthood: An Overview of Meaning and Mental Health, supra note 34, at
60. See also Wilson & DeShane chapter on grandparents in FAMILIES IN LATER LIFE, 108 (1979); and
Kahana & Kahana, supra note 34.
" Johnson, supra note 34, at 549.
" A. KORNH"AER & K. WOODWARD, supra note 14, at 53-62.
,0 Johnson, supra note 34, at 557.
,1 Z. BLAU, OLD AGE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1973); Wood & Robertson, supra note 36.
" Kivnick, supra note 34, at 62-63.
,' California, Iowa, North Carolina, Oregon and Washington. See Freed, Joint Custody Laws:
An Analysis and Comparative Study, 9 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 4025 (1983).
Freed, supra note 43.
" H.R. 4266, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983).
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Of course, the joint custody legislation has been accompanied by continued
lip service to the "best interests of the child" standard for determining how custody
awards should be made.4 6 One would therefore expect the literature on joint custody
to demonstrate that it is, in fact, in the best interest of the child. Instead, the authors
of a recent article reviewing the social science research findings relevant to joint
custody have concluded that available studies on the advantages and disadvantages
of joint custody are "egregiously inadequate, and for the most part the debates
have been nourished solely by opposing ideologues." '47 There is reason to believe
that available research findings regarding joint custody are largely overlooked by
courts and legislatures.4 8
In the absence of a generally accepted body of research conclusively
demonstrating the importance of the grandparent-grandchild relationship, and the
impact of this relationship on families, it is not advisable to adopt a uniform visita-
tion law. Further research is needed to discover which policies and laws will best
promote the interests of children, parents, and grandparents. This does not mean,
however, that existing legislation ought to remain unexamined. On the contrary,
in the rush to pass legislation to satisfy various pressure groups and to erase the
unhappy results of particular cases, ' 9 statutes have been passed which do not ade-
quately anticipate and address certain recurring issues. The following section
examines a variety of issues surrounding the newly created rights of grandparents
in light of current social science research findings.
III. STATUTORY VISITATION RIGHTS FOR GRANDPARENTS
A. Who Should Have Visitation Rights: Grandparents or Any Adult?
The first issue usually addressed in visitation legislation is whether to recognize
visitation rights belonging only to specific categories of persons (for example, grand-
parents), or whether to grant visitation rights to any third person adult depending
,6 Despite criticism by some authorities, most notably, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, infra note
58, the doctrine that custody and visitation matters should be determined by the "best interests of
the child" continues to dominate both statutory and judicial language. See generally Mnookin, Child-
custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 226
(1975); Wald, Thinking About Public Policy Towards Abuse and Neglect of Children: A Review of
Before the Best Interests of the Child, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 645 (1980); and Note, State Intrusion into
Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1353, 1390-91 (1974).
" Clingempeel & Reppucci, Joint Custody After Divorce: Major Issues and Goals for Research,
91 PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 102, 124 (1982).
" Clingempeel and Reppucci suggest that joint custody awards may be inadvisable in some cases,
because the increased contact between the parents might exacerbate conflict. Since it is generally agreed
that conflict has negative effects on children, the increased conflict between the joint custodians would
mediate the otherwise positive effects on children of continuing the relationship with both parents.
Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 47, at 110. One can assume a relatively high level of conflict
where the parents cannot even agree to joint custody of their children. Yet, there are courts that would
make joint awards in such circumstances, and few states have statutes that require the agreement of
both parents to awards of joint custody. See Freed, supra note 43, at 4025.
- See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
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on the specific relationship that has developed between the child and the adult seeking
such rights. The category approach can, and is likely to be, narrowly interpreted
by the courts to exclude all persons outside the category. 0
The vast majority of the states have thus far chosen the category route." These
statutes should define grandparent to avoid otherwise inevitable problems of
statutory interpretation: Does grandparent include the natural parent of a putative
father? 2 If so, under what circumstances? Does grandparent include the natural
parent of a stepparent or the stepparent of a natural parent? 3 And why stop at
grandparents? With the graying of the population, more and more people will be
great-grandparents. Should they not have the same rights as grandparents? Some
states have already accorded great-grandparents these rights." ' Then one might ask,
why stop at grandparents and great-grandparents? Why not grant visitation rights
to siblings" and other relatives? 6
10 Despite generally broad discretion in the courts to determine custody and visitation issues in
"the best interests of the child," the common law rule was that court-ordered visitation over the objec-
tion of a parent should not be awarded, except to noncustodial parents. See generally Foster & Freed,
supra note 4; Note, Grandparent Visitation, supra note 1.
Following the general rule of construction that statutes in derogation of the common law are
to be narrowly construed, most cases interpreting a statute creating grandparent rights have interpreted
such statutes narrowly. See, e.g., infra notes 120-27.
, See supra note 12 for a list of the states that have taken the "category" approach to visitation.
5 The status of grandparents whose child gave birth out of wedlock has already risen in several
cases. See In re Visitation of J.O., 441 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. 1982), in which the grandparents tried to
intervene in divorce proceedings for visitation rights with a child born to the mother and her paramour.
The court denied intervention, interpreting the statute as not applying to children born out of wedlock.
Accord In re Unnamed Child, 584 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). Cf. Dogole v. Cherry, 196 Pa.
Super. 46, 47, 173 A.2d 650, 651 (1961). Several states have resolved the issue by statute. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (grandparent visitation does not depend on "marital status of the parents");
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572(C) (grandparent visitation rights when parents "live in concubinage");
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16(3) (rights of grandparents to reasonable visitation does not apply
to out of wedlock cases).
11 If the justification for extending fights to grandparents is related to notions of kinship, bloodlines,
and biological urges, as the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested in Mimkon, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d
199, then there may be reason for treating step-grandparents differently from biological grandparents.
The issue is clarified by statute in Oregon, where "grandparents" does not include step-grandparents.
OR. REV. STAT. 109.121 (1981).
", Statutes in seven states specifically provide for visitation by great-grandparents: ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 25-337.01; CALIF. CIV. CODE § 4601; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 11-7.1; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 38-129; NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1003, 1012, 1013; Wis. STAT. ANN.,
9 767.245(4).
" In the absence of specific statutory authority to award sibling visitation, the courts are general-
ly reluctant to do so. See, e.g., Sandor v. Sandor, 444 So.2d 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). For
that reason, states that decide as a matter of policy that sibling visitation is as significant as grandparent
visitation should authorize courts to make such awards. A few have already done so. In Arkansas,
brother or sister, regardless of the degree of blood relation, can petition for visitation rights. ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 57-137 (Supp. 1983). Visitation by the "children of a deceased parent" is available by
statute in three states: CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572(D); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 123.123.
56 Courts are also reluctant to award visitation to other relatives without specific authority to
do so. See Wick v. Wick, 403 A.2d 115 (Pa. 1979) (order granting visitation to aunt, uncle, and grand-
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Another approach, taken by only a handful of states, focuses on the particular
relationship existing between the child and the person seeking visitation rights, and
gives legal recognition to such rights depending on the strength of that relation-
ship, and not on its title. 7 This approach is analogous to that taken by courts
which have recognized the rights of psychological parents in addition to the rights
of biological parents. This would allow a myriad of significant adults in a child's
life-foster parents, stepparents, relatives, psychological parents-to enforce visita-
tion rights. 8
Prior to the recent onslaught of grandparents statutes, most courts allowing
court-ordered visitation by grandparents did so because of the strength of the par-
ticular relationship which had developed between grandparent and grandchild, not
because grandparents as such were entitled to see their grandchildren. Thus, grand-
parents who had been in loco parentis to the child, or who had developed strong
psychological bonds, might be granted visitation rights. 9 By the same reasoning,
other nonparent adults have also been granted visitation rights. 60
Another option is to combine the category and significant relationship ap-
proaches as has been done in Idaho. This hybrid statute would grant visitation
rights to those grandparents who have established a substantial relationship with
the child."'
parents overturned because court had no authority to grant such visitation); cf. Gotz, 274 Wis. 472,
80 N.W.2d 359 (maternal aunt granted visitation where noncustodial mother lived too far away to
visit child).
As in the case of siblings, states that wish to extend visitation privileges to relatives other than
grandparents ought to legislate accordingly. A few have already done so. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,
§ 11-7.1; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.09; UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5; VA. CODE § 20-107.
" See supra note 12.
" In a widely-acclaimed book first published in 1973, Drs. Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit introduced
the notion of a "psychological parent" to describe an adult to whom a child is primarily attached,
who is not that child's biological parent. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTs OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter cited as G.F.S.-II. The authors are highly influential and
controversial authorities on children. Joseph Goldstein, a lawyer and psychoanalyst, is a professor of
law at Yale University Law School and a professor at Yale's Child Study Center, The late Anna Freud
was director of the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic in England. Albert J. Solnit is a professor of
pediatrics and psychiatry at Yale University School of Medicine, director of the Yale University Child
Study Center, and on the faculty of the Yale Law School. Together they wrote a second widely-read
book, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979) [hereinafter cited as G.F.S.-Il]. Their concept
of "psychological parent" who has assumed the parenting role towards a child has crept into the language
of courts. See, e.g., James v. McLinden, 341 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Conn. 1969); Bennett v. Jeffreys,
40 N.Y.2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 277, 387 N.Y.S. 821 (1976); New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Services
v. Torres, 185 N.J. Super. 234, 447 A.2d 1372 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. 1980), aff'd, 185 N.J. Super.
182, 447 A.2d 1343 (1982).
" See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hawkins, 102 111. App. 3d 1037, 430 N.E.2d 652 (111. App. Ct. 1981)
(maternal grandmother, with whom child lived after mother was murdered, allowed to petition for
visitation).
6 See, e.g., Looper, 581 P.2d 487 (a stepmother who had developed a close relationship with
her stepchild was granted visitation rights to contribute to the child's emotional well-being).
61 IDAHO CODE § 32-1008.
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In deciding whether to choose the category approach or the significant rela-
tionship approach to visitation rights, certain important factors should be taken
into account. There are few research findings to support the presumption in grand-
parent statutes that the grandparent relationship is uniquely significant to either
grandchildren or grandparents.6 2 There are, however, the oft-cited findings of various
judges stating that the relationship is unique, important, and worth preserving.
For example, in an early case permitting grandparent visitation after the grand-
child had been adopted, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
Grandparents ordinarily play a different role in the child's life; they are not authority
figures, and do not possessively assert exclusive rights to make parental decisions.
At best, they are generous sources of unconditional love and acceptance ...
It is a biological fact that grandparents are bound to grandchildren by the un-
breakable links of heredity. It is common human experience that the concern and
interest grandparents take in the welfare of their grandchildren far exceeds anything
explicable in purely biological terms. . . . Visits with a grandparent are often a
precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which devolve upon
the grandchild from the relationship with his grandparents which he cannot derive
from any other relationship. 3
The extension of visitation rights specifically to grandparents has also been
justified by courts as a way of recognizing the value of kinship64 and the need
to understand one's roots.6 5 These purposes would not be served by extending visita-
tion rights to persons not biologically related to the child.
The category approach serves the additional purpose of limiting the number
of people able to use the courts to seek legal access to children. It is an essentially
conservative approach, altering the common law in increments instead of turning
it on its head.6 6 At common law, visitation rights were viewed as an encroachment
62 See supra notes 20-40 and accompanying text.
63 Mimkon, 66 N.J. at 437, 332 A.2d at 204.
6' Tremayne Quame Idress, 286 Pa. Super. at 487, 429 A.2d at 44 (Kinship ties are still very
important in our society. A sense of closeness to relatives can be critical to a child's wholesome and
happy development.).
63 People ex rel. Simmons v. Sheridan, 98 Misc. 2d 328, 414 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979),
aff'd, 79 A.D.2d 896, 435 N.Y.S.2d 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 445 N.Y.S.2d
420 (1981).
6 The author assumes that grandparents are unlikely to lose the rights they have so recently gained.
For that reason, there is little discussion on the wisdom of allowing anyone, even grandparents, to
enforce access to children over the objection of the child's parent. For a discussion written prior to
most of the new statutes, see Gault, supra note 4, and Gault, Grandparent-Grandchild Visitation, 37
Tax. B.J. 433 (1974) for a discussion of the problems raised by narrow, grandparent visitation rights.
Gault suggests that multiple sets of divorced parents and their possibly divorced parents (grandparents)
can lead to a large number of persons seeking access to the same child. Gault, supra note 4, at 484-85.
At least one court has made that same criticism in a case ending grandparent visitation after a step-
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on the custodial rights of parents. Only in exceptional cases did the court award
such rights to someone other than a noncustodial parent, reasoning that to do other-
wise would create conflicts and infringe on the authority of the custodial parent. 67
This view is not completely without support in the psychoanalytical community.
One commentator has cautioned that some people do not sufficiently appreciate
the significance and destructive potential to the child of loyalty conflicts that might
be generated in a court battle between parents and grandparents." Thus, there are
reasons for adopting the category approach.
A number of commentators, however, have taken the alternative position that
the law ought to support and nourish all significant relationships which children
have with other adults, not only with grandparents. Forcibly breaking a strong
affectionate relationship with any adult will harm a child by depriving him or her
of an important source of support. It may also cause the child to unnecessarily
experience a deep sense of loss and undermine his or her sense of security and
stability. 6
9
Another reason for expanding the categories of persons who have regular access
to children, even over the objections of their parents, is to help prevent child abuse.
Child abuse is well recognized as a national problem, with dramatic increases in
the number of child abuse cases reported: 8,000 cases in 1968; 416,000 in 1976;
700,000 in 1978; and 851,000 cases in 1981.70 It is not clear whether this increase
has been in actual cases or in the number of cases reported; either way, the extent
of the problem is clear.
Increasing access to children can be helpful in two ways. First, one factor con-
67 For fuller discussions of the common law rights of grandparents see Foster & Freed, Grand-
parent Visitation, 5 J. DIVORCE 79 (1982); Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents: One Step
Closer to the Best Interests of the Child, supra note 4; Note, Visitation Rights of a Grandparent Over
the Objections of a Parent, supra note 4.
61 Hearings, supra note 5, at 70-71 (statement of Dr. Andre Derdyne). Dr. Derdyne's cautions
were based on the psychoanalytical theories propounded by Goldstein, Freud & Solnit in G.F.S.-I, in
which the authors proposed that the law go even further in protecting the authority of a custodial
parent. Arguing from the assumption that children need to be in the continuous care and custody of
an autonomous parent, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit suggest that even a noncustodial parent should
not be able to use the courts to force visitation over the objections of the custodial parent. G.F.S.-I
supra note 58, at 116-17. That particular proposal has been widely criticized. See Dembitz, Book Review,
83 YALE L.J. 1304 (1974); Foster, Book Review, 12 WnaMonraT L.J. 545 (1976); Strauss & Strauss,
Book Review, 74 COLUMBIA L. REV. 996 (1974); Wald, Book Review, 78 MICH. L. REV. 645 (1979);
Zaharoff, supra note 4, at 182-85. However, much of the criticism has pointed to the studies by Wallerstein
& Kelly, supra note 22, and Heatherington, Cox & Cox, supra note 23, which found that children
benefit from continued contact with both parents after divorce. There are no similar empirical studies
on the benefits of court-ordered visitation with nonparents.
" See Foster & Freed, supra note 4; Zaharoff, supra note 4, at 191.
70 Statistics compiled by the American Humane Society, reported in vol. 1 of the WASHINoTON
REPORT (May 1984) published by the Society for Research in Child Development.
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sistently identified as a contributing cause of child abuse has been the isolation
of the parent-child relationship.7 ' Some authorities have theorized that without
privacy and isolation, a pattern of maltreatment cannot be established and
maintained. 72 In one of the first empirical studies on the subject, the findings
demonstrated that abusing mothers were more likely than non-abusing mothers to
have visits with friends and relatives infrequently and to want to have such visits
more frequently. 7" Thus, social isolation allows abuse to occur in the first place.
Because increasing access to children reduces the social isolation of the family, it
could be a factor in limiting abuse.
Second, authorities believe that children who have been maltreated will fare
better afterwards if they have someone in their social network who provides com-
pensatory acceptance, nurturance, and a positive model for social experience. 7 The
importance of parental autonomy would thus appear to be outweighed by the value
of assuring that children have contact with adults who can ensure a variety of role
models.
B. When To Allow Court-Enforced Visitation
Once it is decided who is entitled to petition for visitation rights, the issue
of when to permit such rights arises. Only a minority of states have open-ended
statutes permitting grandparents to petition for visitation rights under any cir-
cumstances, regardless of the child's custodial status.75 All states focus on the in-
terests of the child rather than the grandparents, and allow visitation only when
it is determined to be in the best interest of the child and not when it is determined
to be detrimental to the child.
There are, however, different considerations which come into play, depending
on the child's custody arrangements. This section examines the appropriateness of
legally enforceable visitation rights when the child is living in his intact, natural
family, when he is living with only one of his natural parents, and when the child
is living with neither of his natural parents.
" J. GARBARINO & G. GILLIAM, UNDERSTANDING ABUSIVE FAMILIES (1980); Kotelchuck, Child Abuse
and Neglect: Predictions and Misclassifications, in CHILD ABUSE PREDICTIONS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
(1982); and Starr, A Research Based Approach to the Prediction of Child Abuse, in CHILD ABUSE
PREDICTIONS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1982).
72 J. GARBARINO & G. GILLIAM, supra note 71, at 44.
" Starr, supra note 71, at 98. Starr's study compared abusive families with a demographically-
matched control group, and tested for a variety of "causes" identified in the literature. He was unable
to demonstrate empirically a connection between abusive families and most of the factors thought to
place families at greater risk of abuse. His findings did, however, support the infrequency of visiting
with friends and relatives and a desire for greater frequency as significant factors in abusive families.
'4 J. GARBARINO & G. GILLIAM, supra note 71, at 44.
75 Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New York, and North Dakota. See
supra note 3, for full citations to statutes.
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1. Children In Intact Natural Families
The most controversial situation in which courts might order visitation rights
for grandparents is when the child is living in the care and custody of his married,
biological parents, the intact, natural family. There is a strong tradition in the law
of not intruding into the intact, natural family. Those who favor this position label
it the "family autonomy tradition," and emphasize court recognition of the value
our society places on minimizing intrusions into family life, unless the welfare of
the child is endangered. 6 Those who oppose that tradition label it a "parental rights
doctrine," and argue that it overlooks the interests of the child which should be
foremost. Thus, the argument goes, grandparent visitation rights are disfavored
because they are not in the parent's best interest, rather than because they are not
in the child's best interest."
In all but one of the recently reported cases in which grandparents sought visita-
tion with children in the care and custody of an intact, natural family, the courts
adhered to the family autonomy tradition, and denied the petitions." Judicial reluc-
tance to interfere in the ongoing, intact family is consistent with the narrow inter-
pretation usually given to statutorily created visitation rights."9
In Herron v. Seizak, ° the Pennsylvania Superior Court denied visitation rights
to grandparents in a case involving an intact family, even though earlier Penn-
sylvania cases had hinted that the courts might be ready to recognize such rights.'
The court distinguished the earlier cases by pointing out that all had involved at
least one deceased parent and that the concern had been to protect children from
being completely cut off from their family. As neither of these considerations were
,6 On the concept that there exists a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter,
see generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
" See Foster & Freed, supra note 4; Zaharoff, supra note 4.
Grandparents who sought visitation with children living in intact, natural families were denied
visitation in Osteryoung v. Leibowitz, 371 So.2d 1068 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (no dissolution action
pending, therefore grandparents had no basis for action seeking visitation); accord, Ferrell v. Ruege,
397 So.2d 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Curtis v. Coleman, 443 N.E.2d 890 (Ind. App, 1983) (no
divorce, both parents living, therefore grandparents had no standing to petition for visitation); Herron
v. Seizak, 468 A.2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); In Interest of L.L.K., Jr., 591 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1979) (grandparents could not bring independent action for access to children unless a "managing
conservator" had been appointed for the child). But see In re La Russo, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2646
(N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1983).
" See supra note 50, at 120-27.
o Herron, 468 A.2d 803.
1, In Commonwealth ex rel. Williams v. Miller, 254 Pa. Super. 227, 385 A.2d 992 (1978), the
Pennsylvania court awarded visitation rights to a maternal grandmother, after her divorced daughter
died. The language of the decision was broad enough to suggest that any person might seek visitation,
just as any person has standing to seek custody of a child in Pennsylvania. (emphasis added).
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factors in Herron, the court would not interfere with the parents' traditional
authority to determine who will have access to their children.82
In a recent case, however, a family court judge in New York broke with the
family autonomy tradition and agreed to hear a visitation petition filed by grand-
parents against the natural parents. He did so despite a finding that the parents
had a close, positive, intact nuclear family. Furthermore, the grandparents did not
have a strong, ongoing relationship with their grandchildren; their petition was to
see a newborn grandchild, and two grandchildren, aged six and ten, whom they
had not seen in almost six years.83 The New York statute permitting the petition
allows grandparents to apply for visitation rights when conditions exist into which
"equity would see fit to intervene."' 4
There are few other recent or reported cases in which grandparents sought visita-
tion rights with a child in the care and custody of his or her natural parents. Yet,
there are now statutes in five states other than New York which appear to permit
such actions. Legislative histories are largely unavailable, and it is unclear whether
legislatures intended such a serious break with the family autonomy tradition. 5
The parental autonomy tradition is not without support in the psychological
literature. Its proponents include the authors of the most widely publicized,
acclaimed, and criticized books on the custody of children: Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit. 6 Consequently there is evidence supporting the view of one of the experts,
who testified before the House Committee hearings, recommending that Congress
proceed slowly with the adoption of a proposed grandparent statute.
87
2. Children in the Care and Custody of One Natural Parent
Large numbers of children do not live with both of their natural parents. One
survey showed that in 1978, approximately twenty percent of all American children
under eighteen years of age lived with only one, instead of both of their parents.
88
Single parent custody, whether it results from separation, divorce, or the death
Herron, 468 A.2d at 805.
In re La Russo, 9 FAm. L. REp. (BNA) 2647.
' N.Y. DOm. REL. LAw § 72.
CON. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59 ("any person" can petition for reasonable visitation rights in the
best interest of the child); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7) (grants visitation rights "regardless of
the material status of parents or relationship of the grandparent to the person having custody"); IDAHO
CODE § 32-1008 (allows any grandparent who has a "substantial relationship" with a grandchild to
petition for visitation rights); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 ("grandparent may be granted rights after
a finding by the court that visitation rights are in the best interest of the child"); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09-05.1 (grandparents or great-grandparents can be awarded reasonable visitation rights under a
finding that such rights are "in the best interest of the child and would not interfere with the parent-
child relationship").
86 See G.F.S.-I and G.F.S.-II, supra note 58, see also notes 68 & 69 and accompanying text.
, Hearings, supra note 5, at 72 (testimony of Dr. Andre Derdyne).
" Glick, Children of Divorced Parents in Demographic Perspective, 35 J. Soc. Iss. 112 (1979).
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of a parent, raises concerns that are not present when a child is living in his or
her intact natural family. Divorce and death disrupt the normal functioning of
families and cause different amounts of stress to each family member.8 9 These un-
fortunate circumstances add additional factors to consider in relation to grand-
parent statutes.
Prior to the advent of grandparent statutes, the courts were in general agree-
ment about the treatment of grandparents seeking visitation with children in the
custody of one natural parent. For the most part, courts stated they did not treat
such families differently from intact families. That is, the parental autonomy rule
prevailed, and grandparents were denied the right to visit children if the custodial
parent objected.90
Two things are apparent, however, regarding these cases. First, the disrupted
families generally reacted in predictable ways. Often, parents sought help with child
care from kin and in-laws during periods of disruption.9' Second, some courts had
been willing to justify an exception to the parental autonomy rule when these kinds
of special circumstances existed. Thus, some grandparents had been able to obtain
court-enforceable visitation rights even before the present grandparent statutes were
adopted.2 In other cases, where courts were unwilling to be so bold, legislatures
had stepped in to correct seeming injustices. 3 Therefore, it is not surprising, that
the vast majority of states have passed legislation specifically authorizing grand-
parent visitation when the family has been disrupted by the death of a parent or
by divorce.
a. Death. Statutes authorizing visitation upon the death of the child's parent
fall into three categories: (1) Some states allow courts to order grandparent visita-
tion rights under any circumstances, subject, of course, to the best interest of the
child;94 (2) A minority of states permit any grandparent of a grandchild whose
9 See generally Heatherington, Cox & Cox, Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NON-
TRADITIONAL FAMILIES (1982), and studies cited supra notes 22 & 23.
9" Note, Grandparent Visitation, supra note 1.
" That persons in distress generally turn to families and kin for help is a well-recognized pattern
of behavior. Thornton & Freedman, The Changing American Family, 38 POPULATION REP. BUREAU
34 (Oct. 1983).
" See, e.g., Miller, 254 Pa. Super. 227, 385 A.2d 992, which involved prestatutory visitation
rights. In that case, after the parents divorced, the mother went with her child to live with a maternal
aunt. The mother remarried, leaving her child with the aunt, and then died. Upon the mother's death,
the father was awarded custody, and the maternal aunt visited the child. When the maternal aunt died,
the court ordered the father to let the child visit with her last maternal relative, i.e., the maternal grand-
mother. Accord Brock v. Brock, 281 Ala. 525, 205 So.2d 903 (1967); Parks v. Crowley, 221 Ark.
340, 253 S.W.2d 561 (1952); Benner v. Benner, 113 Cal. App. 2d 531, 248 P.2d 425 (1952); Bookstein
v. Bookstein, 7 Cal. App. 3d 219, 86 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1970); Warman v. Warman, 496 S.W.2d 286
(Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Commonwealth v. Perry, 7 Pa. D. 240, 20 Pa. C. 245 (1897); Goodman v. Dratch,
192 Pa. Super. 1, 159 A.2d 70 (1970); and Douglass v. Merriman, 163 S.C. 210, 161 S.E. 452 (1931).
91 See, e.g., infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
94 CONN. GEN. STAT § 46b-59; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(7); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571-46;
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parent or parents are deceased to petition for visitation rights;9" and (3) A plurality
of states, almost half, permit only the parents of the deceased parent to petition
for visitation with their grandchildren." Some of these states extend the same
privilege to great-grandparents,"1 siblings,9 8 or other relatives. 9
If the reason for permitting court-ordered visitation on the death of a parent
is to assure that the child is not cut off entirely from one side of its family,' 0
then the plurality rule makes sense. The law protects that side of the family which
is no longer represented by a living parent. Before the statutory era, some courts
used the theory of derivative rights to allow a child's extended family to stand
in the shoes of the deceased parent.' The surviving parent represents his or her
side of the family, and there is no corresponding need for a legislature to guarantee
connection to that bloodline, by mandating visitation rights for the relatives of
the survivor. He or she is free to function as an autonomous parent who can exer-
cise discretion in allowing his or her own relatives to interact with the child.
The psychological literature suggests there may be a more important reason
to mandate visitation by relatives after the death of the parent. Few events are
more immediately traumatizing to a child than the death of a parent.0 2 In fact,
there are a number of large scale population studies that link parental loss in
childhood to later psychiatric disorders, especially depression. 3 Authorities have
learned, however, that the way particular children react to loss depends on a variety
of factors, including certain protective factors enabling some children to withstand
IDAHO CODE § 32-1008; MONT. CODE ANN, § 40-9-102; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420; WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 26.09.240.
11 AL.sKA STAT. § 25.24.150; FLA. STAT. § 61.13; GA. CODE § 74-112; IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-2;
Ky. REV. STAT. § 405.021; MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D; Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.402; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-9-2; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1012.
96 ALA. CODE § 30-3-4 (1975); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 57-135;
CALIF. CIV. CODE § 197.5; CoLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-116; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 11-7.1; IOWAo
CODE § 598.35; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:572; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.11; OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5; OR. REV. STAT. § 109.121; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1003-13; S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 25-4-53; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301; TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e)(1); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-3-5.
" See supra note 54.
"' See supra note 55.
"' See supra note 56.
,00 Miller, 254 Pa. Super. at 233, 385 A.2d at 995 (1978).
"' See, e.g., Krystek v. Schumacher, 120 Ill. App. 3d 50, 53, 458 N.E.2d 94, 97-98 (1983), vacating
a grandparent visitation order after the child was adopted. The court wrote: "However, as a grand-
parent's status as such is derived from the relationship between the child and the natural parent
.... an adoption which terminates the rights of the natural parent, also removes the basis for the
relationship of the grandparent and thereby ends the status on which the statutory right to visitation
rests." (citations omitted). Accord In re Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1980); DeWeese v. Crawford,
520 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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stress better than others. One protective factor that lessens the impact of losing
a parent is the quality of care and support the bereaved child receives following
a parent's death.1 .4 Thus, if the justification for court-ordered visitation following
the death of a parent is to minimize the child's loss and grief and to prevent the
child from suffering additional losses from being cut off from other relatives, then
the plurality rule seems misguided. The death of a parent followed by the loss of
any grandparent, not just the blood-relatives of the deceased parent, is likely to
decrease the child's ability to deal with the loss. There is, therefore, a reason for
states to adopt statutes ensuring children continued access to all relatives after the
death of a parent.
b. Divorce. Most states also permit grandparents to intervene in divorce or
dissolution proceedings, or to file separate petitions for visitation, when there has
been a legal separation, divorce, or dissolution of the parents' marriage. As in the
case of a parent's death, states are divided between those allowing any grandparent
to obtain court-ordered visitation after a breakup of the marriage, 05 those that
limit visitation rights to the parents of the noncustodial parent,0 6 and those allow-
ing visitation by grandparents if the parent fails to exercise his or her visitation
rights. 107
Since the vast majority of states permit any grandparent to seek court-ordered
visitation when the parents are divorced, the rationale in divorce cases, unlike death
cases, is not dependent on the bloodline theory or on the need to continue contact
with both sides of the family. Presumably, legislatures were persuaded that the
detriment a child might suffer as a result of court intervention in a custody or
visitation matter is not worsened by the presence of additional parties.
There is, however, some question about the wisdom of such assumptions. For
one thing, it is not clear that a right to petition necessarily includes a right to in-
tervene in the dissolution proceeding itself.' 0 If the statute is unclear on this point,
there is a new issue to be litigated. More importantly, there is some concern regard-
ing the impact of additional parties on a dissolution proceeding. Most divorces
Id. at 65.
10S ALA. CODE § 30-3-4; ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1211.1; HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 571-46; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 607(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.7-2; IOWA CODE § 598.35;
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39D; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022; Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.400(3); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-1; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 5; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1013; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301; VA. CODE § 20-107.2;
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1011.
106 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-337.01; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:572; NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.123;
OR. REv. STAT. § 109.121 (all grandparents during pending action; once divorce is granted, only grand-
parents related to noncustodial parent); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e)(2).
,o, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-24.2; W.VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980); (grandparents whose child does
not defend action or whose whereabouts are unknown may petition for visitation).
"I See infra notes 172-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of intervention rights.
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are, in fact, negotiated.' 9 This is significant because it means that while there is
technically litigation pending, matters such as money, property, custody, and visita-
tion are actually settled privately by the divorcing parties and counsel. Some
authorities have argued that the issues of custody and money, including support,
alimony, and property settlements, are inextricably connected."' In light of these
facts, there is something unsettling about encouraging, permitting, or requiring ad-
ditional parties to the negotiation process. It is possible for there to be more than
two sets of grandparents seeking to join the negotiations, if the grandparents
themselves are divorced. Especially in view of the fact that grandparents have no
legal obligation of support, and no interest in marital property, they would enter
such negotiations with rights but no responsibilities."'
Another factor to consider is the recent trend toward mediation as an alter-
native to the traditional litigation and negotiation model for settling domestic
matters. Several states have adopted statutes permitting, encouraging, or requiring
mediation in divorce and custody actions." 2 These statutes raise a number of im-
portant questions: Are grandparents to be permitted, encouraged, or required to
participate in such mediation? How will their participation tip the balance of power?
Should all grandparents participate, even in states where only the relatives of the
noncustodial parent have protected legal interests?
Clearly, the permissive or mandatory intervention of grandparents into the
dissolution process requires clarification by legislatures. The relationship between
mediation and intervention should be explored and clarified, and the resulting
statutes should be consistent with the policies justifying such visitation rights in
the first instance.
c. Informal or temporary separation. Children in the care and custody of
only one parent due to marital discord and informal separation, or due to the
hospitalization, institutionalization, or incarceration of one parent, have been largely
ignored in grandparent visitation statutes.' The absence of any legal proceedings
"I Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 951 (1979).
,,0 Id. at 964.
See infra notes 187-92 and accompanying text on grandparents support obligations, which are
largely nonexistent.
"I See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060, (mediation at the court's discretion); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 4607 (mandatory mediation in custody and visitation cases); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-53 (conciliation
at the request of either spouse or attorney); KY. REv. STAT. § 403.170 (conciliation on request of either
party).
I Although a few states provide for grandparent visitation when there is a legal separation, only
two specifically provide by statute for such visitation in the absence of any legal proceedings. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7-1 and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e)(1). Vermont, however, has recently passed
a statute that is unlike any other. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1012. In addition to the usual grounds
for grandparent standing (i.e., divorce or death of a parent), Vermont now permits grandparents to
petition for visitation when a parent is physically or mentally incapable of making a decision. It appears
1985]
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distinguishes these situations from divorce; however, the impact of these kinds of
separations on a child is likely to be unsettling at best, and traumatic at worst.
If the purpose of the grandparent statutes is to alleviate the loss a child suffers,
and to ensure additional support for the child during times of crisis, then informal
separation should be considered another event that triggers a grandparent's rights." 4
d. Stepparent adoption. An important and recurring issue involves the power
of courts to grant grandparents visitation rights to see a child in the legal custody
of one of its natural parents, when that child has been adopted by his or her step-
parent. Despite litigation in nineteen states,' '1 legislation in seventeen states,"' and
much legal commentary," 7 the issue has been left unresolved by the legislatures
in most states.
Typically, the issue has been viewed as a clash between two creatures of statute:
adoption and grandparents visitation rights. As a result, courts have determined
the outcome of the clash primarily by relying on principles of statutory construc-
tion and by ascertaining legislative intention. The majority of courts have found
that the intent of adoption statutes, to engraft a child onto a new family tree by
severing all ties with relatives of the nonadopting natural parent, should override
the policy of maintaining family ties, which underlies the grandparent statutes. Thus,
the majority common law rule is that stepparent adoptions terminate visitation rights
that the assumption is that an autonomous parent who is able to make a decision will permit grand-
parent visitation.
"' One problem, of course, is that some separations are not caused by marital discord or institu-
tionalization, but are living arrangements necessitated by parental education or career demands. Such
families should probably be considered intact natural families, despite geographical separation of the
parents.
" I The following cases have held that stepparent adoption terminates grandparents visitation: EX
parte Bronstein, 434 So. 2d 780 (Ala. 1983); Woodson v. Kilcrease, 7 Ark. App. 252, 648 S.W.2d
72 (Ark. Ct. App. 1983); Ramey v. Thomas, 382 So.2d 78, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Houston
v. Houston, 156 Ga. App. 47, 274 S.E.2d 91 (1980); Krystek, 120 I11. App. 3d 50, 458 N.E.2d 94;
In re Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555; Browning v. Tarwater, 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135 (1974); Smith
v. Trosclair, 321 So.2d 514 (La. 1975); Bikos v. Nobliski, 88 Mich. App. 157, 276 N.W.2d 541 (1975);
In re Niskanen, 301 Minn. 53, 223 N.W.2d 754 (1975); Acker v. Barnes, 33 N.C. App. 750, 236 S.E.2d
715 (1977); Leake v. Grissom, 614 P.2d 1107 (Okla. 1980); In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985 (Okla. 1977); In
re Nicholas R., 457 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1983); DeWeese, 520 S.W.2d 522; cf. Roquemore v. Roquemore;
275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1969); Mimkon, 66 N.J. 426, 332 A.2d 199; In re M., 140
N.J. Super. 91, 355 A.2d 211 (1976); Layton v. Foster, 61 N.Y.2d 747, 472 N.Y.S. 2d 916, 460 N.E.2d
135 (1984); Scranton v. Hutter, 40 A.D.2d 296, 339 N.Y.S.2d 708, (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); Graziano
v. Davis, 50 Ohio App. 2d 83, 361 N.E.2d 525 (1976); See also Aegerter v. Thompson, 610 S.W.2d
308, 310 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (even if visitation rights had been granted during a dissolution pro-
ceeding, it is questionable whether grandparents would have been entitled to notice of adoption
proceedings).
16 See infra note 119.
"' Foster & Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, supra note 67; Note, Grand-
parents' Statutory Visitation Rights and The Rights of Adoptive Parents, supra note 4; Note, Divesting
Grandparents of Statutory Grandchild Visitation Rights by Stepparent Adoptions, supra note 4; Note,
Adoption: Visitation Rights of Natural Grandparents, supra note 4.
[Vol. 87
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of natural grandparents."' Interestingly, legislatures do not agree. The majority
of legislatures that have dealt expressly with the issue have mandated that visita-
tion rights survive adoption by a stepparent.' 9 Although courts continue to cite
them, many of the leading cases in this area have been overturned by such statues.2
The history of the Oklahoma law on the survival of grandparent visitation rights
after adoption serves as a warning regarding the importance of careful statutory
drafting. The Oklahoma legislature created visitation rights for the parents of a
deceased parent.' 2' In a frequently cited case, Matter of Fox,' 21 involving an adop-
tion by the paternal grandparents with the consent of the natural father, the
Oklahoma court found that the adoption terminated the visitation rights of the
maternal grandparents, even though the child's mother was deceased. It did so in
an opinion that claimed to rest on the statutory adoption scheme. The legislature
responded by amending the law to permit continued visitation when a "consent
to adopt" is executed to a blood relative.' 23 While the new statute would allow
grandparents like those in Fox to retain their visitation rights (because the father
in Fox had consented to adoption by his parents, who were blood relatives), it
did not help grandparents who want to visit a child adopted by his stepfather.
Because a stepparent is not a blood relative the amendment was held inapplicable
to a stepparent adoption in another oft-cited case, Leake v. Grissom.'2 " Therefore,
adoption by stepparents was held to cut off grandparents visitation rights.
The legislature was not happy with this result and amended the statute again,
to provide for reasonable grandparent visitation rights when the parents are divorced
or where one parent is deceased and the child is adopted by either a blood relative
or the natural parent's spouse. In such cases, the parents of the deceased or divorced
natural parent are able to obtain visitation rights.' 2 5 This may have settled the prob-
"' See supra note 115.
Statutes in twelve states specify that grandparent rights survive dependent adoptions: 1984 ALA.
AcTs 84-25; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56-215(b); CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5; GA. CODE § 74-112; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-129; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-129; MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 119, § 39D; MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.022; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1014 (Purdon 1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-54; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1016.
But see statutes in four states which permit stepparent adoptions to terminate grandparent visita-
tion rights: CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-1-116; IOWA CODE § 598.35; MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-6-7; and NEv.
REV. STAT. § 123.123.
120 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-215(b) (Supp. 1983) overrides Poe v. Case, 263 Ark. 488, 565 S.W.2d
612 (1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-129 overrides Browning, 215 Kan. 501, 524 P.2d 1135; LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 572 overrides Trosclair, 321 So.2d 514; TEx. F ,. CODE ANN. § 14.03(d) overrides DeWeese,
520 S.W.2d 522. Within the past year, the legislatures in Alabama and Florida have amended the statutes
in those states to override previous case law which allowed stepparent adoptions to terminate grand-
parent rights. 1984 Ala. Acts 84-254, overriding ex parte Bronstein, 434 So. 2d 780; and 1984 FiA.
LAWS 84-64, overriding Ramey, 382 So. 2d 78.
,, OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16(3) (1971).
121 In re Fox, 567 P.2d 985.
"2I OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16(3) (Supp. 1978).
12- Leake, 614 P.2d 1107.
25 OKLA STAT. tit. 10, § 60.16(3) (Supp. 1981).
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lem. In two cases decided since the latest amendments, however, the Oklahoma
courts have continued to construe the visitation statutes narrowly. For example,
in Matter of K.S., T. W., and G.S.,I6 children's paternal grandparents were not
permitted to petition for visitation rights after their daughter's parental rights were
terminated by the court. The court held the statute was limited to cases where the
parents were divorced or where one parent was deceased, and had no applicability
in situations where a parent was judicially determined to be unfit. Most recently,
a similar result was reached where a stepfather adopted his wife's children after
her former husband's parental rights were terminated for failure to pay support.
The paternal grandparents were found to be without standing to petition for visita-
tion rights because their rights were derived from their divorced son's rights, and
had, therefore, been terminated prior to the adoption, at the same time the father's
rights were terminated. '
3. Children Living With Neither of Their Natural Parents
A great many children live with neither of their natural parents for some or
all of their lives. Included in this category are children in foster care (where
arrangements can range from voluntary, informal agreements made by those who
are temporarily unable to care for their children'2 8 to involuntarily placed children
adjudicated dependent, neglected, or abused);' 9 children in institutions, who have
been adjudicated in need of supervision or delinquent, or who are awaiting trial; "'
and children in permanent placements through adoption at birth or later. Grand-
parents and other relatives may seek access to any of these children.
a. In Loco Parentis. It is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the number
of children who are in the care and custody of friends or relatives at the request
of parents who are unable or unwilling to care for them for a period of time. Legally,
216 In re K.S., T.W., and G.S., 654 P.2d 1050 (Okla. 1982).
'" Alexander v. Miller, 10 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 1327 (Okla. Ct. App. March 13, 1984).
,2, Children may be "voluntarily" placed in foster care by parents who are unable or unwilling
to care for them for some period of time, or may be adjudicated "neglected", "deprived", "in need
of supervision" or "abused" and involuntarily removed until their parent(s) can be "rehabilitated."
In Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that it
is the poor who most frequently resort to "foster care" on a voluntary basis. The middle and upper
classes presumably rely on less formal arrangements for child care. Much has been written about foster
care. See generally Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role
in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J 887 (1975); Foster & Freed, Child Custody, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 423 (1974); Mnookin, supra note 46; Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interests?
43 HAw. ED. Rv. 599 (1973); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search
for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1975); Wald, supra note 46; Wald, State Intervention
on Behalf of Neglected Children: Standards For Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring
the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976).
"' While the standards for involuntary removal of children from the custody of their parents
vary from state to state, every state has a removal statute and procedure. For a survey of state laws
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the parents remain guardians and custodians of their children, while someone else
acts in loco parentis. The absence of any legal rights in the friends or relatives
may have little to do with the effect of the separation on the child. These effects
are more likely to depend on the reason for the separation, its length, and on the
quality of care received in the interim. Nevertheless, as in the case of informally
separated married couples, only two states have specifically provided for grand-
parent visitation when the child is informally and temporarily separated from both
parents.' 3 ' A few states, however, have distinguished situations where the persons
who act in loco parentis are the grandparents themselves. In these states, grand-
parents who live with and care for their grandchildren for a period of time may
acquire enforceable rights to visit those grandchildren after they are returned to
the care and custody of their parents.' 3 2
b. Foster Care. Children who have been formally placed in state-sanctioned
foster care programs are in a different situation. Unless the parents surrender their
rights to the child, the placement is considered temporary; thus, the mandate to
the social service agency charged with overseeing foster care is to protect the family
unit and work to reunite parent and child.' Toward that end, parents are, in theory,
encouraged to visit their child. In reality, the timing and conditions of such visita-
tion are often inadequate for a variety of reasons, including overworked social
workers and a lack of funds.'3 4
Some states allow grandparents and other relatives to visit children who are
in foster care, either by laws specifically referring to foster care' 31 or by statutes
,30 Children who have been institutionalized for health or developmental reasons present a dif-
ferent problem. Ordinarily, the problem is not one of limiting visitation, but of encouraging parents
and relations to maintain a relationship with the child. That problem is outside the scope of this Article.
Neither does the Article address the specific issues related to children who are removed from their
homes due to their own wrongdoing.
,' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1; TEx. F~w. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e)(6).
,32 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(2a); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1014 (grandparents can
petition for visitation rights when child has lived with grandparent for more than twelve months); TEx.
FA . CODE ANN. § 14.03(e)(6) (grandparent who lives with child for 24 months can petition for access).
IDAHO CODE § 32-100 allows a grandparent who has a "substantial relationship" with a grandchild
to petition for visitation rights. Presumably, that language would permit a grandparent who resided
with a grandchild or acted in loco parentis to so petition.
"3I The New York statute is typical. The legislative intent to protect the natural parents is set forth.
[I]t is generally desirable for the child to remain with or be returned to the natural parent
because the child's need for a normal family life will usually best be met in the natural home... ;
The state's first obligation is to help the family with services . . . to reunite it if the child
has already left home ...
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384-b(1)(a)(ii),(iii) (McKinney 1983).
1'1 One study, cited by the United States Supreme Court in Smith v. Organization of Foster Families,
431 U.S. 816, 836 n.39 (1976) (citing CmD WELFARE INFORMATION SERVICES, PARENTAL VISITING IN-
FORMATION, New York City Reports, Table No. 1 (Dec. 31, 1976)), found that 57.4% of all foster
children in New York City had had no contact with their natural parents for the previous six months.
"' See, e.g., CALIF. WVELF. & INST. CODE § 362(b); Smith v. Lascaris, 106 Misc. 2d 1044, 432
N.Y.S.2d 995 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980).
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providing for grandparent petitions whenever there is any action affecting the custody
of children. 36 Because formal foster care requires some sort of court approval or
review in most states, it can be considered a proceeding affecting custody. Thus,
grandparents seeking visitation rights during foster care proceedings may affect the
outcome of the foster care decisions.
In California, as in most states, dependent children may be placed in foster
care involuntarily, if a court finds that such disposition is in the child's best
interest.'" Prior to placement, the law mandates a social study. The California
legislature recently passed a statute which requires the social study in every depen-
dent child proceeding to contain a discussion of whether the best interest of the
child will be served by granting reasonable visitation rights to grandparents.'' The
California statute is the first of its kind.
There are certainly good reasons for permitting grandparents to visit children
in foster care. Because foster care placement is considered temporary, there is no
attempt to sever the child from his or her natural family and weld him or her to
the foster family. Although legally considered a part of his or her natural family,
the child undergoes the psychological effects of separation from it. Presumably,
there is a strong interest in minimizing the negative effects of such separation. One
way to do that is to permit and encourage grandparents to visit children in foster
care. In an investigation of foster care, Fanshel and Shinn found that the intellec-
tual, psychological, and physical development of children in long-term foster care
was enhanced by visitation and contact, however minimal, with the biological
family.' 39
Encouraging relationships that are beneficial to children in foster care is made
even more desirable by the gap between foster care's operation in theory and its
operation in fact. As the Supreme Court has recognized in Smith v. Organization
of Foster Families,I" the theory that foster care is temporary is far removed from
its reality. For many children, foster care means "long term limbo.""' Studies
have shown that even when it is clear a foster child will not be returned to his
or her natural parents, it is rare that he or she will achieve a stable home life through
adoption into a permanent family. Instead, foster children frequently drift from
one foster home to another."' In these circumstances, visitation by the grandparents
can provide continued ties to kin and some continuity of relationships over time.
" See, e.g., CoLO. Rv. STAT. § 19-1-116; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-112; and MicH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.27.
'" CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 362(a).
'3' CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358.1.
"' Fanshel & Shinn, Status Changes of Children in Foster Care: Final Results of the Columbia
Longitudinal Study, 55 CnmD WELFARE 143, 145 (1976).
Smith, 431 U.S. 816.
"' Id. at 835-36.
42 See studies cited by the court in Smith, 431 U.S. at 837.
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c. Termination of Parental Rights. Some children are separated from both
their natural parents permanently, by court termination of the parental rights, with
or without a subsequent adoption. Generally, the purpose of termination proceedings
is to free the child for adoption by another parent or parents. In reality, however,
there are some children whose parents' rights have been terminated but who are
never attached to a new family by adoption.'4 3 Thus, there are times when it is
in the child's interest not to terminate parental rights, even when a parent cannot
adequately care for him or her, where the parent can still provide something of
value to the child.' Whether a state permits grandparent visitation to continue
after termination of parental rights should be a factor in determining the best in-
terests of the child. Where a termination of the parent's rights also divests grand-
parents of their rights, the value of the latter relationship to the child, and the im-
pact of its loss, becomes a factor in determining whether it is in the child's best
interest to terminate parental rights.
Because the issue has arisen in a number of cases already, and is likely to recur,
legislatures should address the question of under what circumstances, if any, ter-
mination of parental rights should also divest the grandparents of visitation rights.'4
Most courts which have decided the issue have held that the termination of paren-
tal rights also terminates the rights of grandparents.'46 The courts' reasoning has
been two-fold. First, courts have relied on the derivative rights doctrine of grand-
parents rights. Under this theory the grandparent's status is derived from the status
of the child's parents. Because the grandparent can stand no higher than his or
her own child, once the parent has lost his or her rights to the child, the grand-
parents also lose their rights.'47 Second, courts have focused on the policy reasons
for terminating parental rights: The termination of parental rights is intended to
break old ties, to allow adoption, and to permit the child to begin anew. Thus,
no purpose is served by continuing ties with the grandparents. Even when adoption
is not imminent, courts have found that delay in severing ties between the child
and his natural relatives only makes adoption and adjustment more difficult.'4 8
", For a report on the data on children who are removed from their parents see Wald, supra note 128.
See, e.g., In re Michael G., 9 Fm. L. REP. (BNA) 2708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) in which an
agency moved to terminate the rights of loving but retarded parents who were unable to adequately
care for the developmentally retarded son. Finding that the child's chances of being adopted were
"tenuous" and that he would benefit from a continued relationship with his parents, the court left
the child in foster care, without terminating parental rights.
"I A few have done so. NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.123.3 (termination of parental rights also ter-
minates grandparent rights); TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 1403(e) (grandparent whose child's parent-child
relationship has been terminated can seek visitation rights).
"I In re Johnson, 210 Kan. 828, 504 P.2d 217 (1972); In re Ditter, 212 Neb. 855, 326 N.W.2d
675 (1982); In re Nicholas R., 457 A.2d 1359; Alexander, 10 FMA. L. REP (BNA) 1327; Krystek, 20
Ill. App. 3d 50, 458 N.E.2d 94; Id re K.S., T. W., and G.S., 654 P.2d 1050. But see Weichman v.
Weichman, 50 Wis. 2d 731, 184 N.W.2d 882 (1971) (grandparent rights are not derivative).
"' In re Ditter, 212 Neb. at 856, 326 N.W.2d at 676; accord, In re Johnson, 210 Kan. 828, 504
P.2d 217; Krystek, 120 Ill. App. 3d 50, 458 N.E.2d 94.
"I In re Ditter, 212 Neb. 856, 326 N.W.2d 675.
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An argument can be made that the relationship between the grandparent and child
is not derivative, but has an importance of its own, which should not be terminated
simply because the parental rights are terminated, particularly where immediate
adoption is not pending nor likely.
d. Termination of Parental Rights Followed by Adoption. Permanent separa-
tion of the child from his natural parents presents an even stickier set of issues
when it is followed by adoption: What should happen to the visitation rights of
grandparents whose grandchild is adopted? Should it matter who adopts the child?
Should it matter who the grandparent is?
The laws governing adoptions are statutory in every state. Most adoption laws
were originally enacted in the 1940s. At that time the adoptees were usually in-
fants, frequently illegitimate, whose parents had surrendered them for adoption
by strangers, before the child had any real contact or relationship with its natural
family. Adoption statutes reflected this social reality; they provided for closed records
to prevent the child from suffering the stigma of illegitimacy, and to protect the
family against intrusion. The intent of the laws was to sever the child from the
old family and "engraft him on to a new family tree."
Although the social reality has changed, 4 9 the laws in most states have not.
As a result, most courts faced with the need to decide whether grandparents may
visit their natural grandchildren have reasoned that adoption and grandparent visita-
tion rights are both creatures of statute, and therefore, the decision should be based
on statutory interpretation. In the absence of specific authority to hold otherwise,
most courts have found that adoption terminates the rights of natural
grandparents.'5I According to the courts, this permits the foundation of a relation-
ship with the new parents that can 'bloom and grow faster' free of the threat
of outside interference . . . posed by the appearance of a natural, well intended
parent ... [or grandparent]."'' In other words, the societal interest in the establish-
ment of a permanent and stable family unit requires the severence of all former
family bonds and relationships. s5
The statutory exceptions are narrow. In most states, the exceptional cir-
cumstances warranting continued grandparent visitation are limited to stepparent
"I For a discussion of the sociological changes involving adoptions, see In re Adoption of Anthony,
113 Misc. 2d 26, 27-32, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377, 378-80 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) and sources cited therein.
The court noted that in 1975, 50% of all adoptions in New York involved foster children who were
older, rather than illegitimate babies who had never known their biological parents.
"I Poe, 265 Ark. 488, 565 S.W.2d 612; Krystek, 120 II1. App. 3d 50, 458 N.E.2d 94; In re Gardiner,
287 N.W.2d 555; Browning, 215 Kan. 501, 525 P.2d 1135; Bikos, 88 Mich. App. 157, 276 N.W.2d
541; Acker, 33 N.C. App. 750, 236 S.E.2d 715; In re Ditter, 212 Neb. 856, 326 N.W.2d 675; In re
Fox, 567 P.2d 985; DeWeese, 520 S.W.2d 522. Contra Roquemore, 275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 432; Graziano, 50 Ohio App. 2d 83, 361 N.E.2d 525.
"I In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d at 1360 (quoting In re Christine, 121 R.I. 203, 206, 397 A.2d 511,
513 (1979)).
"Iz Ex parte Bronstein, 434 So.2d at 784.
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adoptions, 5 1 or adoption by grandparents,15' apparently on the theory that all grand-
parents should be treated equally. Only a few states have created a more general
exception for adoptions by other relatives, or permit any adoption to be an "open
adoption." 5'
The majority position is consistent with the family autonomy tradition. Since
an adopted child is once again attached to an intact family, that newly created
family should be accorded the same respect, integrity, and freedom from court
intervention that is accorded to an intact, biological family. A court which orders
adoptive parents to allow visitation, but refuses to order biological parents to do
so, is indeed guilty of treating the two differently. Furthermore, as several courts
and commentators have noted, if grandparents rights survive adoption, there is
the spectre of multiple sets of grandparents and great grandparents (and if they
divorce, step-grandparents, etc.) vying for a child's time. 56
There may be, however, good reasons for allowing grandparent visitation to
continue after the adoption of older children, and in all cases of adoption by
relatives. It is one thing for adults to use the adoption process to reorganize legal
relationships with children of deceased parents, or whose parents have married,
or divorced and remarried. It is another thing to ignore the fact that the child
may experience lingering emotional ties to the parents and family members he or
she knew before the adoption.' It seems particularly inappropriate to apply a doc-
trinal "severing of the child from one family tree and engrafting him or her onto
another" when the other family tree is nothing more than another branch of the
same tree, as is the case when adoption by a blood relative terminates visitation
by others.5 8 Some courts, sensitive to the fact that children may benefit from those
"I' See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-4; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-215(b); GA. CODE § 74-112; KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 30-129; MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119 § 39D; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301; and TEx. FAm. CODE
ANN. § 14.03(e)(6).
"' CAL. CIv. CODE § 197.5; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102; PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 1015; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-54.
.., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16(3) (visitation rights survive adoption by stepparent or blood
relative); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1016.
Courts in California, New Jersey, New York, and North Dakota have created "open adoptions"
without specific statutory authorization. See Reeves v. Bailey, 53 Cal. App. 3d. 1019, 1024-26, 126
Cal. Rptr. 51, 55-57 (1975) (paternal grandparent visitation allowed after adoption by maternal grand-
parents); In re Buccholz, 326 N.W.3d 203 (N.D. 1983) (parties could agree to visitation by paternal
aunt, uncle, and grandparents as part of divorce decree), and cases cited infra notes 159-67 and accom-
panying text.
"I Bikos, 88 Mich. App. 157, 276 N.W.2d 541; In re M., 140 N.J. Super. at 95, 355 A.2d at
213; Gault, supra note 4.
"' The distinctions between family adoptions and stranger adoptions is described in Maidment,
Access and Family Adoptions, 40 MOD. L. REv. 293 (1977), which discusses the British experience
with open adoptions.
"' See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 287 N.W.2d 555 in which the adoption by a paternal aunt and uncle
of a child whose mother died, and whose father's paternal rights had been terminated, was found to
terminate any rights of the maternal grandparents. Contra Graziano, 50 Ohio App. 2d 83, 361 N.E.2d 525.
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lingering ties to their biological families, especially after they have suffered the
loss of one or both parents, have denied adoptions to prevent the unnecessary sever-
ing of such ties.'" 9
A few states have pioneered the concept of an "open adoption" in which the
court approves an adoption decree allowing or mandating continued visitation with
members of the child's biological family. Under this approach, the New York courts
have allowed visitation with parents"60 and birth siblings' 6' after a child's adoption
by foster parents, and have permitted grandparent visitation after a child has been
adopted by stepparents,"61 grandparents,' 63 and foster parents.' 64 In so doing, New
York courts have considered the humanitarian nature of visitation laws which per-
mit equity to intervene and to award grandparent visitation:
When one or both of the parents have died, the child usually suffers great emo-
tional stress. By enacting [N.Y. Domestic Relations Law] Section 72, the Legislature
has recognized that, particularly where a relationship between the grandparents and
grandchild has been established, the child should not undergo the added burden
of being severed from his or her grandparents who may also provide the natural
warmth, interest and support that will alleviate the child's misery.",'
In recognizing open adoptions, the New York court implicitly considered several
factors: (1) The changed social reality, and the fact that not only is secrecy no
longer critical, but it is impossible where the adoptive child is old enough to know
his birth parents; (2) The fact that adoptions by relatives do not involve adjust-
ment to a new family; and (3) A growing awareness of the need for an adoptive
child to know his roots for psychological and medical reasons.'"
Open adoptions have also been allowed in Maryland, New Jersey, and
England."67 In a New Jersey case, the court appointed a guardian on whom the
"5' Mathis, 258 S.C. 321, 188 S.E.2d 466; Cook v. Cobb, 271 S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d 612 (1978);
Ramey, 382 So.2d 78.
60 In re Adoption of N., 78 Misc. 2d 105, 355 N.Y.S.2d 956 (N.Y. County Sur. Ct. 1974); In
re Abraham L., 53 A.D.2d 669, 385 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976).
I6, In re Adoption of Anthony, 113 Misc. 2d 26, 448 N.Y.S.2d 377 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1982).
162 Scranton, 40 A.D.2d 296, 339 N.Y.S.2d 708; Layton, 61 N.Y.2d 747, 460 N.E.2d 135, 472
N.Y.S.2d 916, aff'g 95 A.D.2d 77, 466 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
"I Simmons, 98 Misc. 2d 328, 414 N.Y.S.2d 83; People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d
320, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420 (1981).
164 In re Jones, 74 Misc. 2d 821, 346 N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (upon consent of foster
parents).
"I Sibley, 54 N.Y.2d at 327, 429 N.E.2d at 1052, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
166 Id.
16, Weinshel v. Strople, 56 Md. App. 252, 466 A.2d 1301 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); In re Adop-
tion of Children by F., 170 N.J. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (natural
father permitted visitation after stepparent adoption); Kattermann v. Di Piazza, 151 N.J. Super. 209,
376 A.2d 955 (N.J. App. Div. 1977) (mother permitted hearing before denying visitation after adoption
by maternal grandmother); In re S., [1974] 1 All E.R. 109.
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adopted children could call to enforce their right to see their (divorced) natural
father after they were adopted by their stepfather. 68
Allowing open adoptions, or other permanent placement of children while con-
tinuing some relationship with the child's biological parents, has been endorsed
by experts who have worked with children and families. It has been suggested that
such alternatives to either long-term foster care, or adoption that terminates paren-
tal rights, would benefit children who have been abused or neglected by their parents,
yet retain memories of them and emotional ties to them.' 9 Presumably, the same
argument can be made to justify continued visitation with the child's grandparents
after adoption.
C. Procedural Rights
Once a decision has been made to create substantive legal rights to visit with
grandchildren, the issue is raised concerning what procedural rights attach to them.
1. Notice
For example, the issue arises as to whether grandparents have a right to be
notified of proceedings directly affecting grandchildren, such as custody, guardian-
ship visitation, neglect, abuse, paternity, court-review of foster care placements,
or adoption; or indirectly affecting them, as in divorce, separation, or the dissolu-
tion of a marriage. It is clear that other rights, for example, a right to intervene,
or to petition in certain events, may be rendered meaningless unless there is notice
of the proceeding. While the issue has arisen in a number of cases,' 70 only a few
legislatures have thus far made the notice requirement statutory. 7'
A number of other issues arise concerning notice. If notice is required, who
must receive it, all grandparents or only those who have a right to intervene in
the proceedings? Again, in the interest of minimizing litigation, notice issues could
be addressed by legislation.
SI In re Adoption of Children by F., 170 N.J. Super. 419, 406 A.2d 986.
169 Derdyne, Rogoff & Williams, Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights After
Long-Term Foster Care, 31 VAD. L. REv. 1165 (1978); see also Wald, supra note 128.
110 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Berman, 44 Cal. App. 3d 687, 118 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1975) holding
that grandparents were not entitled to notice of stepparent adoption. In Muggenborg v. Kessler, 630
P.2d 1276 (Okla. 1981) (notice of adoption proceedings filed by the other grandparents was required
to be sent to one set of grandparents). Although the issue involved custody, not visitation, the Muggen-
borg decision is noteworthy because the court found that the right of kin related to the same degree
of consangunity was constitutionally required. Id. at 1278.
" ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-212(g) (notification to parents of deceased parents of children if the
parent-child relationship had not been eliminated at the time of death); contra FLA. STAT. § 61.13 ("stand-
ing to seek enforcement of visitation rights does not mean that grandparents must be made parties
or be given notice of dissolution, or be contestants"); TEx. Fim. CODE ANN. § 11.09(3) (persons having
access to children under order of court are entitled to notice of suits affecting the parent-child relationship).
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2. Intervention
A second procedural issue concerns the rights of grandparents to intervene in
various proceedings affecting the custody and legal status of their grandchildren.
Since intervention issues have been litigated frequently," 72 it would behoove
legislatures to address the issue directly. This is particularly true in proceedings
that are not concerned solely with the child, such as divorce, separation, dissolu-
tion, and annulment proceedings. These proceedings involve a cluster of issues con-
cerning the rights and obligations between the parents, including property divisions,
alimony, and support. Because there is room for debate as to the desirability of
permitting grandparent intervention in such proceedings, legislative clarification
seems especially important here. Few states, however, have addressed the specific
rights of grandparents to intervene in divorce proceedings by clear statutes.
1
7
There are policy reasons why states might want to prohibit grandparent in-
tervention in marital actions which affect not only custody and visitation rights,
but also important aspects of the parent's relationship. First, couples should be
encouraged to do what they already do in most cases: settle the details of their
separation by private negotiation and court approval.' 74 States agreeing that there
are benefits to such private dispute settlements ought not to make them more dif-
ficult by allowing additional parties, like grandparents, to intervene. From the grand-
parents' point of view, no rights need be lost by exclusion from divroce proceedings.
There are no states in which a divorce cuts off grandparents' rights. On the con-
trary, the filing of a divorce action is frequently one of the limited numbers of
events that triggers such rights.
The argument in favor of mandating such intervention, of course, is that grand-
72 Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 (1981); Cox v. Stayton, 273 Ark. 298, 619
S.W.2d 617 (1981); Roquemore, 275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80 Cal. Rptr. 432; In re Marriage of Meiers,
51 Cal. App. 3d 120, 123 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1975) (grandparents could not intervene in dissolution pro-
ceedings to seek visitation rights); R.A.D. v. M.E.Z., 414 A.2d 211 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980); Putnal
v. Putnal, 392 So.2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Krieg v. Glassburn, 419 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind. App.
1981) (grandparents could not intervene in custody proceedings supplementary to divorce action); In
re J.R. & S.R., 315 N.W.2d 750 (Iowa 1982); Clary v. Clary, 426 So.2d 238 (La. 1983) (not an abuse
of discretion to allow grandparent intervention in divorce); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 622 S.W.2d 252
(Mo. App. 1981); New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Serv. v. Torres, 185 N.J. Super. 234, 447 A.2d
1372 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1980); D.Y.F.S. v. D.T. & J.T., 171 N.J. Super. 520, 410 A.2d
79 (1979); Logan v. Smith, 602 S.W.2d 647 (Okla. 1979) (no right to intervene in divorce proceedings);
Zachary v. Zachary, 159 Or. 346, 63 P.2d 1080 (1937); Mathis v. Johnson, 258 S.C. 321, 188 S.E.2d
466 (1972); Cook, 271 S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d 612; Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982).
173 Such intervention is allowed by statute in three states: GA. CODE ANN. § 74-112(b)(1); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 452.400; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2. But statutes in two states are explicit that the right
to petition does not mean that grandparents have a right to intervene in dissolution proceedings: FLA.
STAT. § 61.132(c); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.
', For sources of psychological studies indicating that children benefit when parents agree on
custody arrangements see, Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and
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parents in need of a court's decree permitting them to visit their grandchildren
should not be required to increase litigation costs, and waste time and energy by
having to litigate a second time and in a separate judicial hearing. Generally, it
is better to resolve all custody matters affecting the child in one proceeding.
A grandparent's need for a right to intervene, or at least to be heard, in pro-
ceedings solely concerned with the custodial or legal status of their grandchildren,
for example, in adoption, termination of parental rights, abuse, or neglect cases,
may be more critical. In a number of states, adoption, or the termination of paren-
tal rights, serves to terminate the grandparents' rights as well.'I" Given this possibility,
appellate courts in some jurisdictions have allowed grandparents to intervene in
adoption or termination proceedings." 6 Other courts have refused to overrule the
trial court's exercise of its discretion to control the evidence in the case, even though
it means the grandparent loses a significant right, without being heard by the court.'"
Grandparents who are permitted to intervene in these proceedings have no right
to affect dispositions by withholding their consent. No state requires the consent
of a grandparent to the adoption of a grandchild, or to the termination of a parent's
rights, unless the grandparent is also the legal guardian of the child. This is clearly
evidence that grandparents' rights are not regarded as highly as parental rights; most
states require the consent of a noncustodial parent, who has enforceable visitation
rights, to the adoption of his or her children.'7 8 Few states permit open adoption
allowing a noncustodial parent to retain visitation rights after a stepparent
adoption. 7 9 Thus, the requirement that a noncustodial parent's consent be obtained
prior to a child's adoption has prevented the custodial parent from using an adop-
tion proceeding to arbitrarily cut off the child's relationship with the noncustodial
parent. One commentator recently has argued that a noncustodial parent has a
constitutional right to visit with his or her children.' 80 Grandparents' rights, only
recently recognized, are not generally considered to rise to a similar level of
importance.
Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1131-32 nn. 19-24 (1978).
" See supra note 150.
76 Quarles, 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757; Mathis, 258 S.C. 321, 188 S.E.2d 466; Cook, 271
S.C. 136, 245 S.E.2d 612; In re J.R. & S.R., 315 N.W.2d 750 (grandparents had a right to intervene
in juvenile court proceeding to terminate parental rights pursuant to IowA R. Civ. P. 75 because "any
person interested in the subject matter" can intervene); Cf. Roquemore, 275 Cal. App. 2d 912, 80
Cal. Rptr. 432, (denying grandparents intervention in adoption because visitation would not be affected
by the outcome of the adoption proceeding).
', Krieg, 419 N.E.2d 1015 (grandparents not entitled to be heard in adoption proceeding even
though visitation rights would be terminated); In re Nicholas, 457 A.2d 1359 (R.I. 1983) (paternal grand-
father of child born out of wedlock had no standing to be heard at stepparent adoption). See also
In re Coverdell, 30 Wash. App. 677, 637 P.2d 991 (1981) (denying foster parents a right to intervene
in a dependency proceeding brought against the child's mother).
"' See, e.g., Butler v. Giles, 47 Ala. App. 543, 258 So. 2d 739 (1972); Delgado v. Fawcett, 515
P.2d 710 (Alaska 1973); cases cited in Annot., 91 A.L.R. 1387 (1934); Annot., 47 A.L.R. 2d 824 (1956)
(consent of a divorced parent is essential to adoption).
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3. Standards for Awarding Visitation
Most legislatures have set forth the circumstances under which grandparents
can petition for visitation rights. In most of these statutes, however, the decision
to grant visitation rights in a particular case is left entirely to the judge's discre-
tion. Often, the only restriction on the exercise of that discretion is that the visita-
tion further the best interests of the child.'"' Only a few states provide any further
guidance for the exercise of the judge's discretion.' 82 In a handful, the courts are
required to consider the existing relationship between the child and petitioner, and
whether the visitation will interfere with the parent-child relationship.' 3 One state,
New Mexico, has required that visitation rights not conflict with the child's educa-
tion or with prior established visitation privileges.' 84
A compelling argument can be made that statutes should articulate clear stan-
dards, so that a parent can know when visitation will be ordered, and can cooperate
in negotiating such visits, instead of litigating them.' 5 This is the direction in which
most states have moved regarding custody. Typically, custody statutes will list a
variety of factors to be considered in awarding custody.' 86
Another aspect of the decision in each case involves the burden of proof. Again,
there is a marked distinction between statutes involving parents and those involv-
ing grandparents and other nonparents. While states frequently mandate visitation
with the noncustodial parent, except under narrowly prescribed circumstances,",8
grandparents only benefit from a similar presumption, that visitation with them
will be in the child's interest, in a few jurisdictions.' 88 Given the lack of social
,' See supra notes 160-69 and accompanying text, on visitation rights after adoption.
,so Novinson, Post-Divorce Visitation Untying The Triangular Knot, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 121 (1983).
,' The California statute is typical:
Reasonable visitation shall be awarded to a parent unless it is shown that visitation would
be detrimental to the best interests of the child. In the discretion of the court, reasonable
visitation rights may be granted to any other person having an interest in the welfare of the child.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 4601.
2I In a recently-passed statute, Vermont became the first state to spell out a list of factors to
be taken into account in actions to award grandparent visitation rights. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013.
"' IDAHO CODE § 32-1008; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022; NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.123; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-05.1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 1012-1014.
'" N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-1.
,' The argument is made by Mnookin & Korhauser, supra note 109.
286 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24.
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) ("A parent is entitled to reasonable visitation rights
unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger the child's physical, mental, or
emotional health.").
,8' See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601. However, a few states provide that, in the discretion of
the court, grandparents shall be awarded visitation unless it is shown that such rights are detrimental
to the child's welfare. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 571; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, § 11-7.1. Another state
has phrased the question of whether visitation is in the child's best interests. WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.09.240
(1983). A similar presumption has been created by case law in New Jersey. See Globman v. Globman,
158 N.J. Super. 338, 386 A.2d 390, 394 (N.J. App. Ct. 1978). Cf. Browder v. Harmeyer, 453 N.E.2d
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science research findings supporting the presumption that the grandparent-grandchild
relationship is necessarily important to either, the majority rule appears appropriate.
4. Responsibilities of Grandparents with Visitation Rights
It can be argued that a person who claims legal rights to visit a child should
also bear some legal responsibility for that child, including financial support.
Generally, however, the law has separated the rights from the responsibilities.
In every state, parents are responsible for the support of their children.
Sometimes those responsibilities survive the termination of parental rights and the
adoption of the child. 189 Although they are rarely invoked, some states have filial
responsibility laws imposing special financial responsibilities on relatives, including
grandparents, of the poor. 9 ' These laws are generally designed to ensure the care
and support of elderly and needy relatives, who either do not receive or do not-
qualify for welfare.' 91 An argument can be made that a similar responsibility should
be imposed on grandparents who have obtained visitation rights. Where there is
no statutory obligation, however, the courts have been reluctant to impose any
support obligations on grandparents. 19
The relationship between a parent's duty to support and his or her right to
visit is an issue whenever the child is no longer in that parent's custody. Generally,
courts are reluctant to condition parental visitation rights on compliance with sup-
port orders. They have also been hesitant to terminate support obligations in cases
where the custodial parent has frustrated attempts to visit the child. 1
There are few reported cases in which trial courts have imposed support obliga-
tions on grandparents seeking visitation rights, and this Author has found no case
301 (1983) in which the court found that a grandparent's due process rights were not violated when
her grandchild was taken for placement in a foster home without a finding that the grandmother was
unfit. The court noted that regardless of the grandmother's relationship to the child, it can never and
will never, absent adoption, approach the importance attached to the parent-child relationship.
", See, e.g., Care v. Marshaman, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 195 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1983).
"9 For an analysis of such statutes see Garrett, Filial Responsibility Laws, 18 J. FAm. L. 793 (1980).
Id. at 793-794.
"' The issue has arisen in at least two cases involving minors who applied for public assistance
for their out-of-wedlock children. In both cases, the courts held that they could not be denied such
aid on the basis of their parent's resources, as grandparents are not financially responsible for support
of grandchildren. Haggard v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 98 Idaho 55, 558 P.2d 84 (1977);
Boines v. Levine, 44 A.D.2d 765, 354 N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. App. Div.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974).
This author does not take the position that the relatives (grandparents) of the poor should have
any greater responsibility for their grandchildren than do the relatives of the middle and upper classes.
" See, e.g., VanZee v. VanZee, 302 Minn. 371, 226 N.W.2d 865 (1975); but see Reardon v.
Reardon, 3 Ariz. App. 475, 415 P.2d 571 (1966); Klobnock v. Abbott, 303 N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 1981)
(parental rights could be terminated for failure to pay child support without good cause). For a student
comment suggesting that it would be in the best interests of the child to allow such termination see
Comment, Termination of Parental Rights: Should Nonpayment of Child Support Be Enough? 67 IoWA
L. REV. 827 (1981). See generally Summary of Termination Statutes, 9 FAM. L.Q. 827 (1981).
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in which an appellate court has allowed such an order to stand.' 94 In a Utah case,
an appellate court held that it would be appropriate to impose responsibilities
on a stepparent who was seeking a hearing to determine his right to visit his step-
children after his divorce.' 95 The court reasoned that a stepparent, who has no
statutory duty of support in Utah, had assumed such a duty by placing himself
in loco parentis. Correspondingly, he would also be entitled to enforceable visita-
tion rights. The same argument could be made for grandparents. Only Connecticut
has specifically stated that a grant of grandparent visitation rights shall not be con-
tingent upon any order of financial support.' 9 6
There are several good reasons for making a duty to support and the grant
of visitation rights dependent on one another. One is that in divorce cases there
is evidence that the parties themselves choose this arrangement. One authority, having
negotiated divorce settlements, has described the issues of support and custody as
"inextricably bound."' 97 The law would acknowledge a reality that already exists.
Knowing that grandparents were obligated to help out financially would likely make
it easier for many parents to accept the fact that courts can order grandparent
visitation and therefore lead to more negotiated arrangements and fewer lawsuits.
A second reason for imposing a support obligation on anyone asserting a legal
right to visit a child is that support is one of the most critical factors affecting
a child's well-being. There is evidence that one of the most detrimental aspects
of divorce is the downward economic mobility of the mother, who has traditionally
been awarded sole custody of the children. 9 Anything that increases the economic
well-being of the single-mother head of household will inure to the benefit of the
children. It has been suggested that the deleterious effects on children due to the
father's absence can be eliminated if economic stability is provided to the mother. ,99
If grandparents are to receive the benefit of this relatively new right of visitation
it is logical to impose some responsibility to aid their grandchildren.
"I In Blalock v. Blalock, 559 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), a Texas appellate court reversed
a support order entered against grandparents in a divorce action since neither grandparent intervention,
nor the granting of access to children, served to create a general duty to support the child. A similar
outcome was reached by the high court in Florida, in Engle v. Engle, 323 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1975),
where maternal grandparents, who were awarded custody in a divorce action, were ordered by the lower
courts to contribute to the support and welfare of the children. The court reversed the order, reasoning
that the duty to support belongs to the father, not to the grandparents, despite the custody award.
'95 Gribble, 583 P.2d 64.
,96 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-59.
,' Mnookin & Korhauser, supra note 109.
See Desimone-Luis, O'Mahoney, & Hunt, Children of Separation and Divorce: Factors
Influencing Adjustment, 3 J. Div. 37 (1979); Heatherington, Divorce: A Child's Perspective, 34 AMER.
PSYCHOLOGisT 851 (1979). On the economic difficulties of divorced women, see sources cited in Note,
Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Child Relocation Controversies, 35 STAN. L. REV. 949, 951 n.l 1 (1983).
See also R. DELEONE, SMALL FuTuREs (1979) on the detrimental effect of economic inequality on children.
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Persons with statutory visitation rights might also be held responsible for main-
taining the relationship by continuing to visit the child once visitation rights have
been awarded. In an otherwise thoughtful article on postdivorce visitation by a
parent, one commentator dismissed the question of whether visitation should be
forced on a noncustodial parent as being self-evident. It should not be forced, the
argument goes, because forced visitation would become, at best, an empty ritual. 20 0
The problem, of course, is the creation of a dual standard. Visitation is frequently
forced on children who do not want to see the visitor for one reason or another,
yet must engage in the meaningless ritual, because a court, not believing it mean-
ingless, has ordered it. There are ways of creating a responsibility to continue the
relationship without ordering a grandparent to visit, such as the proposal that
damages be awarded against a parent or grandparent who disregards the scheduled
visitation.20 ' There is also the possibility that visitation rights could terminate if
not exercised, although few courts have been willing to invoke such a serious remedy
against parents who fail to visit.
2 2
5. Termination and Frustration of Grandparent's Visitation Rights
As with any rights, issues arise concerning under what circumstances they may
be lost. Two sets of circumstances might lead to a court's termination of a grand-
parent's visitation rights: The occurrence of events or circumstances not directly
related to the grandparent-child relationship, such as the termination of parental
rights, or the adoption of the child; and circumstances or developments occurring
in the relationship between the grandparent and grandchild.
Events like the termination of parental rights or the adoption of the grandchild
are sometimes grounds for terminating or divesting grandparents rights.20 3 As sug-
gested above, courts have wrestled with the issue of whether those events should
terminate rights by trying to ascertain the legislative intent. Legislatures that have
not already done so, should determine whether such events do or do not divest
grandparents of their rights, and should pass appropriate legislation. Even if
legislatures choose to leave this determination to the court's discretion, legislation
is appropriate to provide guidelines, as not all courts are willing to voluntarily assume
such broad discretion. It makes little sense for trial courts to exercise enlightened
discretion, only to learn from an appellate court that the legislature did not intend
for it to have such discretion.
Visitation rights might also be terminated by a court for changes in the rela-
tionship between the grandparent and grandchild. Most statutes allow a court to
200 Novinson, supra note 180, at 1972.
2"I Bruch, Making Visitation Work: Dual-parenting Orders, 1 FAM. ADvoc. 22 (1978).
'' See infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text on termination of parents' right to visit for
failure to pay support.
101 See supra notes 145-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of grandparent rights after
adoption or termination of parental rights.
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award visitation rights when they are in the best interest of the child, with few
guidelines limiting the court's discretion. Presumably, even in the absence of specific
authority, courts can modify or terminate visitation that is no longer in the best
interests of the child.
The court's discretion could be narrowed or guided by listing factors a court
should consider, as is commonly done in custody statutes. Among the factors that
might be considered are: (a) Threatened or actual physical abuse; (b) Neglect, or
failure to properly care for the child during visits; (c) Failure to support, where
the obligation was imposed; (d) Negative impact on the child's mental, emotional,
or physical well-being; (e) Abandonment, or lapse of time between visits; and (f)
Undermining parental authority, or continued animosity between the grandparents
or parents.
Abuse or neglect of a child are generally grounds for terminating parental
custody and, if not corrected, all parental rights, including visitation.204 Where the
primary justification for grandparents rights is that they benefit the child, abuse,
neglect, or a negative impact on the child's mental or physical health should all
be grounds for terminating such visits.
Generally, the obligation to support a child has not been linked to the right
to visit the child. 21 5 As a result, it is rare that a parent's visitation rights will be
terminated because the parent failed to meet his or her support obligations, although
it has been suggested that cutting off visitation is an appropriate means of enforc-
ing support, 20 6 and a few courts have done so.2"7 If a grandparent were similarly
responsible for some support, the failure to meet that responsibility might justify
the termination of the grandparent's rights.
In the prestatutory era, animosity between the grandparents and parents was
frequently cited as a reason for denying grandparent visitation rights.20 Such
animosity is no longer generally recognized as sufficient reason for denying
visitation.20 9 If, however, the animosity continues and increases, or if there is evidence
21, See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358-62 (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-61
(Supp. 1984); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 384(b) (McKinney 1983). For a list of state statutes on abuse,
see Note, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 243, 272-74 (1982).
2"I See, e.g., Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 345 A.2d 48 (1974); Gani v. Gani, 500 S.W.2d
254 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); but see Reardon, 3 Ariz. App. 475, 415 P.2d 571; Fever v. Fever, 50 A.D.2d
772, 376 N.Y.S.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). On the issue of withholding or denying visitation for
failure to make alimony or support payments generally, see Annot., 51 A.L.R. 3d 520 (1973).
20 Comment, supra note 193.
10, Klobnock v. Abbott, 303 N.W.2d 149 (Iowa 1981); See also Acker v. Acker, 365 So. 2d 180
(Fla. 1978) suggesting that in appropriate cases visitation could be terminated for nonpayment of support.
208 See supra note 1.
209 See, e.g., In re Desjardins, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1229 (Calif. Ct. App. January 25, 1984)
(visitation permitted despite evidence of "continuing internecine conflict"). Accord, Lo Presti v. Lo
Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522, 355 N.E.2d 37 (1976); Lachow v. Barasch, 57 A.D.2d 896, 394 N.Y.S.2d 284
[Vol. 87
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of actual, not simply threatened, attempts by the grandparents to undermine the
authority of the parents, this may be reason to terminate grandparents rights.
Abandonment or lapse of time between visits is rarely a reason for terminating
a parent's right to visit his children.2 10 Neither should it be a ground for terminating
grandparents rights, especially since many grandparents with emotionally close rela-
tionships to their grandchildren visit infrequently or irregularly, even where visita-
tion is encouraged by the parent and there has been no court order. Where the
issue has been raised by parents, the courts have so far found that abandonment
should not be a ground for denying or terminating grandparents visitation rights.II'
Custodial parents can frustrate the visitation rights of grandparents in a variety
of ways that recall the actions which frustrate noncustodial parents rights, by non-
cooperation in the timing and arrangements, or by relocating. In relocation cases
involving visitation rights of noncustodial parents, a number of interests must be
balanced: the custodial parent's rights to both geographic mobility and to act as
the autonomous custodian of the child; the noncustodial parent's interest in a con-
tinued relationship with his child; and the ubiquitous best interest of the child.
It is not uncommon for the courts to require court approval before relocation,
or to approve stipulations that limit the parent's mobility. 212
Given possible constitutional dimensions to the right to travel, 1 3 and to the
autonomy tradition, " ' and considering a good argument can be made that a custodial
parent and child are a family, court involvement in relocation decisions results in
a significant infringement on family life. States permitting court intervention to
assure the best interests of the child, in cases where relocation will deprive a parent
of visitation rights, may have to contend with grandparents seeking similar court
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Scranton, 40 A.D.2d 296, 339 N.Y.S.2d 708; Miller v. Miller, 10 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 1453 (Pa. Sup. Ct. May 25, 1984); Zaffarano v. Genaro, 500 Pa. 256, 455 A.2d 1180 (1983).
"I Barron v. Barron, 184 N.J. Super. 297, 445 A.2d 1182 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (court
would not terminate visitation rights of father who had not seen child in five years); accord, Wilson
v. Wilson, 73 Idaho 326, 252 P.2d 197 (1953); Aud v. Etienne, 47 Ill.2d 110, 264 N.E.2d 196 (1970);
Radford v. Natczuk, 223 Md. 483, 164 A.2d 904 (1960); Johansen v. Lanphear, 95 A.D.2d 973, 464
N.Y.S.2d 301 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (visitation allowed despite the fact that parent had no contact
with child from 1979-83).
211 See In re La Russo, 9 Fm. L. REP. (BNA) 2647, a recent New York case in which the grand-
parents sought visitation with two grandchildren they had not seen in almost six years. The court allowed
the action.
"I See Note, The Judicial Role in Post-Divorce Child Relocation Controversies, supra note 198
for an excellent student piece in which the authors argue that the courts should not determine issues
of relocation.
"I See, Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Parents: Implications for the Right to Travel,
12 RUTOERS L. REV. 341 (1981); Note, Restrictions on a Parent's Right to Travel in Child Custody
Cases: Possible Constitutional Questions, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 181 (1973).
21, See generally, Note, Fundamental Right to a Family Integrity and Its Role in New York Foster
Care Adjudication, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 63 (1978); Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substan-
tive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination Procedures, 68 GEo. L.J. 213 (1979).
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intervention.215 States that would prevent the intrusion of the courts into family
life when such intrusion is unnecessary would do well to consider legislation
specifically prohibiting courts from restricting a parent's geographical mobility for
the purpose of guaranteeing a grandparent's visitation rights. A few have already
done so.2" '
A final issue involves the frequency with which grandparents can invoke the
assistance of a court to enforce their rights. One commentator has recommended
limiting actions to prevent harassment of the parent and to minimize the burden
of defending against endless petitions. 217 Some states have limited the number of
petitions that can be brought for just that reason .218
Vermont has gone even further, in providing that grandparents cannot appeal
from decisions involving visitation rights.219 That position makes a good deal of
sense because appeals could otherwise be taken be either party, not only on the
major issue of whether or not visitation should be ordered, but on the amount
or timing of such visitation. In the interest of avoiding endless litigation, and in
recognition of the great amount of discretion usually allowed trial judges in cases
involving custody, such a restriction may make some sense.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since 1966, statutorily created grandparent visitation rights have spread to forty-
eight states. Legislative attention to certain recurring issues, such as the effect on
visitation rights of changes in the parent-child relationship through termination of
parental rights or through adoption, could aid in avoiding, or at least limiting,
litigation. Procedural rights to notice, intervention in divorce, custody, and other
proceedings affecting the legal status of children should be adequately addressed
by legislatures. State legislatures should be encouraged to evaluate existing statutes
to address the issues which have repeatedly encouraged litigation. This evaluation
should begin by addressing the underlying social policies furthered by grandparent
statutes.
With few exceptions, the recent legislation creating grandparent visitation rights
does not extend the same right to other adults seeking to maintain a relationship
with a child over the objections of the child's parents. While there is little scientific
literature to support the underlying presumption that the grandparent-grandchild
2 There have been two reported cases in which grandparents with visitation rights sought to pre-
vent custodial parents from moving. In both, the courts upheld the right of the parent to move. it
re Marriage of Jenkins, 116 Cal. App. 3d 766, 172 Cal. Rptr. 331 (1981); Fisher v. Fisher, 390 So.
2d 142 (Fla. 1980).
116 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-1-116(3); FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(c).
27 Zaharoff, supra note 4, at 201.
2,8 Petitions can be brought only once in every two years in Colorado and Montana. CoLo. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-116(3); MONT. CODE ANN. 40-9-102(3).
239 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1011-16.
Vol. 87
38
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol87/iss2/6
GRANDPARENT RIGHTS
relationship is uniquely beneficial and important to either grandparent or grand-
child, the grandparent statutes nevertheless furthers a significant social policy. Nar-
rowly drafted grandparent statutes can be viewed as a limited accommodation to
political realities that do not drastically alter the traditional view that the family
is, and should be, a unit that functions best with limited state interference. The
narrow grandparent exception to the common law rule that no adult except a non-
custodial parent should have access to a child over the custodial parent's objec-
tions thus limits state interference. Where this policy is intended, it makes sense
for legislatures to draft narrow statutes spelling out the limited circumstances in
which grandparents can petition for the court's help in maintaining visitation rights.
From this view, it follows that changes in the parent's status, due to the termina-
tion of parental rights or the adoption of the child, should serve to terminate grand-
parent's rights as well. Unless the result is too politically unpopular to be ignored,
as has been the case in stepparent or grandparent adoptions, the new, adoptive
family should have as much autonomy as the biological family.
A different social policy is furthered by legislation that does not focus only
on the rights of grandparents, but rather on the rights of children. The Author
agrees with those who argue that the autonomous family policy is really a policy
that furthers the rights of autonomous parents, and may conflict, at times, with
the rights of children. From this point of view, grandparent statutes may indeed
be too narrow to adequately protect children's rights. There is good evidence that
children benefit from continued relationships with adults other than their parents
or grandparents in a variety of situations, particularly when they are separated from
their parents, as in foster care placements or during the stressful periods following
a parent's or sibling's death. A statute that grants visitation rights to only grand-
parents, or worse, only grandparents related to the deceased parent, does not ade-
quately protect the needs of all children. A better statute would protect the child's
interest in maintaining his or her relationship with any adult. Any built-in presump-
tions that treats grandparents more favorably than other relatives or stepparents,
for example, should not be acceptable unless and until studies demonstrate the
grandparent-grandchild relationship is uniquely important.
A consistent policy of protecting those relationships that a child develops with
adults would also resolve the recurring problem involving the effect of adoption
on visitation rights. Once it is established that any adult with a significant relation-
ship to a child can petition for visitation rights, there is little justification for ter-
minating that right simply because the adult's label has changed from aunt to non-
aunt, or from grandfather to non-grandfather, by virtue of an adoption decree.
Instead visitation rights would be granted or denied based on the strength of the
child's relationship with the adult.
Until social science findings can conclusively demonstrate which of the com-
peting social policies underlying the various grandparent statutes are most impor-
tant or in need of the greatest protection from the law, a uniform visitation law
is to be avoided. Experimentation with different laws, designed to protect different
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interests, is preferable at this stage to a uniform law, based on one social policy,
to the exclusion of any others. The diversity of the currently existing statutes can
provide us with invaluable sources for comparison, ultimately enabling us to make
a more enlightened decision regarding the policies we choose to promote in our
society.
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